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INTRODUCTION
Public outcry against the execution of so-called bilateral nonsurrender agreements between states is widespread in both the local
and international news media. The number of notes and comments
regarding the Statute of the International Criminal Court' ("Rome
Statute") in legal literature is growing rapidly, and the issue of the
validity and/or propriety of these bilateral non-surrender agreements
are increasingly becoming contentious. Not surprisingly, these trends
raise several questions that the international community must
address. What exactly are these agreements? What do they entail?
Would it be advisable for states to enter into such agreements? More

1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
Statute],
available at
[hereinafter
Rome
A/CONF. 183/9
(1998)

http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/99_corr/cstatute.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2004).
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importantly, are such agreements valid under international law?
These and other pertinent questions are what this essay seeks to
explore.
Following this introduction, in Part I, is a short overview that
outlines the more salient points of the Rome Statute.2 A brief
situation report follows in Part II, which narrates the events that led
up to the execution of the Republic of the Philippines-United States
Bilateral Non-Surrender Agreement ("Agreement"). This agreement
is typical of the bilateral non-surrender agreements the United States
has negotiated and, for the purposes of this essay, it shall serve as a
model bilateral non-surrender agreement. Pertinent parts of this essay
will reference, if not scrutinize outright, the provisions of this
agreement.' Part III provides an analysis of the legal consequences
that stem from the execution of a bilateral non-surrender agreement.4
Next, Part IV will present measures that commentators have
suggested as alternatives to the execution of bilateral non-surrender
agreements.5 What follows then in Part V is a set of recommended
courses of action for states that wish to fulfill their obligations under
both the Rome Statute and a bilateral non-surrender agreement.6 The
final section presents an appropriately sober conclusion.7
I. THE ROME STATUTE: A BRIEF PRIMER
The United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court in Rome ("U.N.
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries") adopted the Rome

2. See infra Part I (giving a general overview of the Rome Statute).
3. See infra Part II (providing the background on the Agreement).
4. See infra Part III (explaining that bilateral non-surrender agreements have
consequences affecting the parties as well as the international community at large).
5. See infra Part IV (outlining the various international legal measures
available for parties to use rather than bilateral non-surrender agreements).
6. See infra Part V (noting that there are four options for states wishing to
comply with both international customary law and a bilateral non-surrender
agreement).
7. See infra Conclusion (concluding that states ought to strive to end impunity
for international crimes, and rather than executing or carrying out bilateral nonsurrender agreements, states should try to use alternate legal means if they insist on
refusing International Criminal Court ("ICC") jurisdiction over their nationals).
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Statute on July 17, 1998.8 It entered into force on July 1, 2002. 9
Currently, the signatory states number 139, while 91 state parties
have ratified the Rome Statute.10 The treaty brings into existence a
tribunal that exercises jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole. The crimes over
which the International Criminal Court ("ICC" or "the Court")
exercises jurisdiction, as provided for in the Rome Statute, are2
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression.'
Articles 6-8 of the Rome Statute define the first three of these crimes
in greater detail, and feature descriptions and enumerations of
specific, punishable acts for each crime. 13 However, discussion of the
exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression is reserved for
another time, seeing as the crime has been left undefined for now.14
The Rome Statute, as a treaty, is unique in several ways. First of all,
by virtue of its entry into force, it creates a permanent tribunal, the
ICC, that will deal with all occurrences of the most serious crimes of
8. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 128 (stating that the Rome Statute was
signed on July 17, 1998, in Rome).
9. Coalition for the International Criminal Court, A Timeline of the
Establishment of the International Criminal Court (explaining that the treaty
entered force on July 1, 2002, thus becoming binding for states that had ratified or
acceded to the Rome Statute), at http://www.iccnow.org/pressroom/factsheets.html
(last visited Mar. 29, 2004).
10. See id. (describing how 139 states had signed the treaty by December 31,
2000).
11. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 5(1)(a)-(d) (asserting jurisdiction over
the four most serious crimes).
12. Id.
13. See id. arts. 6-8 (defining the terms genocide, crimes against humanity, and
war crimes for the purposes of the Rome Statute). Genocide is defined as "acts
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
Id. art. 6. A crime against humanity can include murder,
religious group ....
extermination, enslavement, deportation or forcible transfer of population,
imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of
fundamental rules of international law, torture, rape and other forms of sexual
violence, persecution, enforced disappearance of persons, apartheid, and other
inhumane acts. Id. art. 7. War crimes include grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions of August 12, 1949. Id. art. 8.
14. See id. art. 5(2) (indicating that the Court will "exercise jurisdiction over
the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in accordance with Articles
121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the
Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime").
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concern to the international community as a whole. Its jurisdiction
and mandate are not limited to specific events that took place in
specific places within a specific time frame. 5 Before the Rome
Statute, ad hoc tribunals administered international criminal justice
holding individuals accountable: the International Military Tribunal
("IMT") at Nuremberg; the International Military Tribunal for the
Far East ("IMTFE") at Tokyo; the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY"); the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR"); the Special Court for Sierra Leone;
6
and other more recently established ad hoc and special courts. 1
Secondly, even though, as a treaty, state parties entered into it, the
Rome Statute provides that the ICC shall exercise jurisdiction upon
individuals, as distinguished from other permanent international
tribunals, such as the International Court of Justice ("ICJ"). 7 The
objects of the ICC's powers and functions are the accused
themselves, subjecting them to investigation, arrest, detention,
prosecution and, if found guilty, incarceration. 8 The Rome Statute
creates obligations on the part of state parties to provide the means
by which to enforce these powers and binds state parties to cooperate

15. See id. arts. 13-21 (outlining the ICC's jurisdiction, as well as the
admissibility of cases and the application of the law).
16. See George S. Yacoubian, Jr., Evaluating the Efficacy of the International
Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia: Implications for
Criminology and International Criminal Law, 165 WORLD AFF. 133, n.21-24
(2003) (noting that the international community has convened four ad hoc
international tribunals to
date,
including the IMT in 1945,
the
IMTFE in 1946, the ICTY at The Hague in 1992, and the ICTR in 1994), available
at http://www.findarticles.com/cf_0/m2393/3_165/97484236/
print.jhtml (last
visited Mar. 22, 2004).
17. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 1 (indicating that the ICC shall "have
the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of
international concern"). The ICJ replaced the Permanent Court of International
Justice in 1946, and acts as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations to
resolve conflicts between states. The International Court of Justice, General
Information
The
Court
at
a
Glance,
at
http://212.153.43.18/icjwww/igeneralinformation/icjgnn t.html (last visited Apr.
14, 2004).
18. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 53-76 (outlining the investigation and
prosecution procedures under the ICC and explaining the rights of the accused).
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with the ICC. 19
The hallmark of the Rome Statute, however, is its allocation of
jurisdiction between the ICC and the state parties. The Rome
Statute's principle of complementarity apportions jurisdiction
between the two. 20 This arrangement vests primary jurisdiction over
cases involving the commission of acts amounting to any of the most
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole
in any state that can exercise jurisdiction over such cases. 21 When
such a state exercises jurisdiction over a case, the ICC deems that
case inadmissible.22 However, the assumption of jurisdiction by a
state over a case does not bar the ICC from later exercising
jurisdiction over the same case.23 Under Article 17, if the state in
question, after conducting its investigation, decides not to prosecute,
and the ICC makes a determination that such refusal to prosecute
stems from the genuine unwillingness or inability of the state to
prosecute, then the ICC can take cognizance of the case.24

II. THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES-UNITED
STATES BILATERAL NON-SURRENDER
AGREEMENT
The Philippine government signed the Rome Statute on December
28, 2000,25 and on the very last day that it was permissible to do so,
19. See id. arts. 86-102 (describing state parties' general obligations to
cooperate with the ICC during the investigation and the prosecution of crimes).
20. See id. art. 1 (noting that the Court's jurisdiction shall be complimentary to
that exercised by member states).
21. See id. art. 17(1) (discussing the admissibility of cases that shall be heard
by the ICC).
22. See id. (explaining that the ICC will not exercise jurisdiction over that case
when a state investigates or prosecutes a case).
23. See id. (stating that cases are admissible to the ICC if and when a state is
genuinely unwilling or unable to prosecute).
24. See M. Tia Johnson, The American Servicemembers' Protection Act:
Protecting Whom?, 43 VA. J. INT'L L.J. 405, 439 (2003) (explaining the procedure
under Article 17 of the Rome Statute that allows the ICC to take jurisdiction over a
case).
25. See Coalition for International Criminal Court, Country Information,
Philippines(indicating that the Philippine Government signed the Rome Statute),
at http://www.iccnow.org/countryinfo/asia/philippines.html (last visited Mar. 22,
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the U.S. Government signed the Rome Statute. 6 However, to this
day, neither party has moved to ratify the same, which, in retrospect,
is to be expected, given the events that were to follow. With the
change of administration, the U.S. Government's policy regarding
the Rome Statute also changed. 7 On May 6, 2002, the U.N.
Secretary General received a communication from the U.S.
government stating that "the United States does not intend to become
a party to the treaty. Accordingly, the United States has no legal
obligations arising from its signature on December 31, 2000. " 28 The

U.S. government also requested that its stated intention not to
become a party "be reflected in the depositary's status lists relating
to this treaty.

29

A Defense Department Operational Briefing revealed the U.S.
government's policy regarding the Rome Statute, as well as the
3°
course of action it had decided upon for dealing with the ICC.

There, when asked about whether or not he was satisfied with the
level of insulation U.S troops enjoyed from the ICC, Donald
Rumsfeld, U.S. Secretary of Defense answered in pertinent part that:
To the extent we're participating in peacekeeping activities that are U.N.
related, we intend to do a similar thing by going around to countries on a
2004); see also Letter from Irene Khan, Secretary General, Amnesty Int'l, to
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President, Philippines (July 17, 2003) (noting that the
Philippines signed the Rome Statute on December 28, 2000 and that the
Statute), available at
Philippines intended to ratify the Rome
http://web.amnesty.org/aidoc/aidoc-pdf.nsf/Index/
ASA350132003ENGLISH/$File/ASA3501303.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2004).
26. See Lucy Martinez, Prosecuting Terrorists at the International Criminal
Court: Possibilitiesand Problems, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 58 (2002) (stating that the

United States signed the Rome Statute during the Clinton administration on
December 31, 2000).
27. See id. (remarking that the Bush administration subsequently "unsigned"
the treaty in mid-2002).

28. Letter from John R. Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security, United States, to Kofi Annan, Secretary General, United
Nations (May 6, 2002), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968pf.htm

(last

visited Mar. 30, 2004).
29. Id.
30. See U.S. Dep't of Defense, Defense Department Operational Update
Briefing (June 26, 2002) (discussing the U.S. policy to exempt U.S. forces from the
available
at
requirements
of
the
Court),
http://www.amicc.org/docs/Rumsfeld6-26-02.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2004).
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bilateral basis. There is a provision in the treaty which permits countries
to come to an agreement bilaterally that-in this case U.S.-forces
operating in their country would not be subject to the court and that they
would not extradite people-Americans-to the court. And it's both
civilian and military.

This marked the beginning of a massive, worldwide campaign on

the part of the United States to secure bilateral non-surrender
agreements from states across the globe. 32 As of this writing, fiftyfive states have reportedly entered into such agreements with the
United States.33 The United States also enacted the American
Servicemembers' Protection Act ("ASPA"), a law that basically
prohibits the United States from cooperating with the ICC.

Significantly, the law also prohibits the United States from providing
military assistance to a government that is a party to the ICC, unless
that government is a NATO or a major non-NATO ally, or unless it
enters into an agreement with the United States-a provision with
supposed support in Article 98 of the Rome Statute.34
On May 13, 2003, Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Blas F.
Ople executed Note No. BFO-028-03, wherein he acknowledged

receipt of U.S. Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone, Jr.'s Note No.
0470, dated May 9, 2003. 31 The substantive provisions of these
diplomatic notes can be divided into two parts. The first part seeks to
31. Id.
32. See Press Briefing, U.S. Dep't of State, State Department Press Briefing
with Richard Boucher (June 12, 2003) (noting the provision of the ASPA that
prohibits military assistance to any country that is an ICC party), available at
http:///www.amiccc.org/docs/Boucher6 12_03.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2004).
33. See American Nongovernmental Organizations Coalition for the ICC,
BilateralImmunity Agreements (listing the numerous countries that are concluding
at
agreements),
immunity
bilateral
http://www.amicc.org/usinfo/administration policy-BlAs.html (last visited Mar.
22, 2004).
34. See Johnson, supra note 24, at 465-67 (discussing ASPA and criticizing its
attempt to preempt the ICC's jurisdiction through the restriction of U.S.
participation in peacekeeping operations).
35. See Agreement Regarding the Surrender of Persons to International
Tribunals, May 13, 2003 U.S.-Phil., State Dep't No. 03-06 [hereinafter Surrender
Agreement] (acknowledging the receipt of Secretary Ople's Note accepting the
terms of the Agreement between the United States and the Philippines), available
at http://www.amicc.org/docs/PhilippinesTextl3MayO3.pdf (last visited Mar. 24,
2004).
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deal with all possible situations that could result in the surrender of a
defined "person" to the ICC; the notes to this portion provide that all
current or former government officials, employees (including
contractors), military personnel, or nationals of one party present in
the territory of the other shall not, absent the express consent of the
first party:
(a) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any international
tribunal for any purpose, unless such tribunal has been established by the
UN Security Council, or
(b) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any other entity or third
country, or expelled to a third country, for the purpose of surrender to or

transfer to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been
established by the UN Security Council.36

The second part of these diplomatic notes builds upon the
aforementioned, and obligates each party to guard against the
possibility of indirectly violating their commitments to each other by
extraditing, surrendering, or transferring the other party's nationals to
a third state.37 When, for example, the Philippines extradites,
surrenders, or otherwise transfers any current or former government
officials, employees (including contractors), military personnel, or
nationals of the United States to a third country, the Philippines will
not agree to the surrender or transfer of that person by the third
country to any international tribunal, unless the U.N. Security
Council has established the tribunal, absent the United States'
express consent. This obligation applies with equal force to the
United States with respect to current or former government officials,
employees (including contractors), military personnel, or nationals of
the Philippines. 38 This exchange of diplomatic notes forms what legal

36. Id.
37. See id. (explaining that both the United States and the Philippines must not

agree to the transfer of a person by a third country to an international tribunal
without the express consent of that person's country, unless the United Nations
established the tribunal).
38. See id. (establishing the reciprocal character of the agreement with the
statement "[p]ersons of one Party present in the other shall not ... be surrendered
or transferred...").
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publicists refer to as a bilateral non-surrender agreement between the
Philippines and the United States.39

III. ARTICLE 98(2) OF THE ROME STATUTE AND
BILATERAL NON-SURRENDER AGREEMENTS
The number of bilateral non-surrender agreements is rapidly
growing. The alarmingly short span of time that has elapsed between
the entry into force of the Rome Statute and the execution of the first
such agreements has brought to light the possibility that some parties
may have entered into these agreements with undue haste and limited
understanding of their ramifications. States should realize that
bilateral non-surrender agreements are liable to result in a variety of
legal consequences that affect not just the parties thereto, but the
entire international community.
A. THE PROVISIONS OF THE ROME STATUTE

One of the ways in which the ICC can acquire personal
jurisdiction over indicted individuals is for the Court to request their
surrender from the state in whose territory they may be found.4 °
Article 89 of the Rome Statute sets forth the authority whereby the
ICC may make such a request:
Article 89: Surrender of persons to the Court
1. The Court may transmit a request for the arrest and surrender of a
person, together with the material supporting .the request outlined in
article 91, to any state on the territory of which that person may be found
and shall request the cooperation of that state in the arrest and surrender
of such a person. States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of

39. See Cosmos Eubany, Note, Justicefor Some? U.S. Efforts Under Article 98
to Escape the Jurisdictionof the InternationalCriminalCourt, 27 HASTINGS INT'L
& COMP. L. REv. 103, 104, 116 (2003) (explaining that the United States has
attempted to "opt out" of the ICC's jurisdiction by concluding bilateral agreements
designed to prevent the surrender of U.S. nationals to the Court under any
circumstances).
40. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 89 (discussing the process by which a
person may be surrendered to the ICC).
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under their national law, comply with requests
this Part and the procedure
41
for arrest and surrender.

However, controversial limitations found in the Rome Statute
counterbalance the ICC's power to make such a request. 42 The
contentious provision is Article 98(2), which states:
Article 98: Cooperation with respect to waiver of immunity and consent
to surrender
2. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would
require the requested state to act inconsistently with its obligations under
international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending state
is required to surrender a person of that state to the Court, unless the
of the sending state for the giving of
Court can first obtain the cooperation
43
consent for the surrender.

B. THE OBLIGATION UNDER ARTICLE 98 (2)
It is important to stress a point that legal publicists have raised
regarding the nature of the conduct required under Article 98(2).
Commentators have submitted, and quite convincingly so, that
Article 98(2) imposes obligations not on state parties or non-parties
to the Rome Statute, but on the ICC itself." In effect, it is the ICC
that is prevented from acting. If the state receiving the surrender
request has an obligation under an international agreement pursuant
to which the sending state's consent is required for the surrender of
said person to the ICC, and the sending state does not give its
consent to such surrender, the proscribed act is the ICC's proceeding
41. Id. art. 89(1).
42. See generally Eubany, supra note 39 (discussing and interpreting the
provisions of Article 98 of the Rome Statute).
43. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 98(2).
44. See Eubany, supra note 39, at 117 (interpreting the "ordinary meaning" of
Article 98(2) to mean that the provision "precludes the ICC from requesting the
surrender of an accused within State A's custody if State A has a prior agreement
with State B regarding the surrender of State B's nationals").
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with a request for surrender. The provision does not directly impose
any obligations nor grant any rights to the state parties and non-party
states involved. Admittedly, it also does not prevent a state party
from entering into an agreement that could have the effect of
preventing the ICC from proceeding with a request for surrender.45
Therefore, the suggested, and seemingly more correct, way of
viewing this provision, then, would be to see it as a rule that
prescribes the conditions under which the ICC may proceed with a
request for surrender. As a result, in cases where the ICC may
properly proceed with a request for surrender, a state party presented
with such a request will be obliged to comply with it. Concomitantly,
"[t]he combined effect of Article 98(2) and the other provisions of
the Rome Statute concerning obligations of states to comply with
requests by the Court only come into play once the Court proceeds to
make a particular request [for surrender] pursuant to its authority
under Article 89(1 ).'146
Thus, a state party that refused to comply with an Article 89(1)
request for surrender and subsequently relied upon a bilateral nonsurrender agreement which is incompatible with the requirements of
Article 98(2) in order to justify such refusal would be in breach of its
obligations to the ICC and other state parties to the Rome Statute.
Simply put, entering into a bilateral non-surrender agreement does
not have the effect of automatically insulating a state from all
requests for surrender that the ICC may make. 7 First, the bilateral
non-surrender agreement must fall within the scope of Article 98(2).
The question of whether or not the ICC is entitled to proceed with a
request for surrender, in light of the specific circumstances of each
case, would then fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the ICC
45. See James Crawford et al., In the Matter of the Statute of the International
Criminal Court and In the Matter of Bilateral Agreements Sought by the United
States Under Article 98(2) of the Statute: Joint Opinion (June 5, 2003), at 2

(summarizing the powers that Article 98(2) grants to states to enter into bilateral
non-surrender agreements), available at http://www.amicc.org/docs/Art98l4une03FINAL.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2004).

46. Id. at 10.
47. See Roy S. Lee, How the World Will Relate to the Court: An Assessment of

the ICC Statute, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 750, 760-61 (2002) (describing the effect
of status-of-forces agreements ("SOFAs") on the ICC's power to request an
individual's surrender in various circumstances).
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itself 48 The ICC, and not the individual states, would have to
determine what legal effect, if any, a particular bilateral nonsurrender agreement would have under Article 98(2)." 9 Pending such
determination, "the requested state should promptly comply with the
request for arrest and surrender."50 However, if the ICC later decides
that Article 98(2) prohibits surrender, and the sending state will not
cooperate, the release of the accused person from custody or any
other restraint should follow."
C. THE OBJECT AND PURPOSE OF THE ROME STATUTE

In a briefing held in London, Pierre-Richard Prosper, U.S.
Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, stated U.S. policy
regarding bilateral non-surrender agreements thus:
Article 98 clearly says that we are allowed to engage in these types of
agreements, international agreements, with the states that allow for the
conditions, to dictate the conditions of surrendering. Essentially it is that
the consent of the sending state, which in this case would be the United
52
States, is required before someone would be transferred to the court.

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell reiterated the U.S.
Government's position, stating in a press conference that the Rome
Statute "provides for Article 98 agreements with those countries who
do not wish their citizens to be subject to the Court when serving in
other countries."53 Similarly, former U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for
48. See Crawford, supra note 45, at 10-11 (indicating that the ICC must decide
under Article 98(2) whether or not to request surrender).
49. See Amnesty Int'l, International Criminal Court: US Efforts to Obtain
Impunity for Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crime (Aug. 2002), at
5 (stating that the ICC, rather than individual states, has jurisdiction to determine
the legal effect of bilateral non-surrender agreements under Art. 98(2)), available
at http://www.amicc.org/docs/aiusimpunity.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2004).
50. Id.at 17.
51. See id. (noting the circumstances under which the accused will enjoy
exemption from ICC jurisdiction and release from custody, and asserting that the
Court may make non-binding requests for additional information from states in
order to have a proper factual basis to make its determination).
52. Press Briefing, Pierre-Richard Prosper, American Embassy London, On the
Record
(Sept.
24,
2002),
available
at
http://www.amicc.org/docs/Prosper9-20-02.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2004).
53. Press Conference, Colin L. Powell, Bogotdt, Colombia (Dec. 4, 2002),
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War Crimes,. David Scheffer, asserted that "even as a non-party,
under Article 98(2), [the U.S.] can negotiate agreements with other
governments that would prevent any American being surrendered to
the ICC from their respective jurisdictions without [the consent of
the United States]. 54
However, an overwhelming majority of states throughout the
world, particularly the European nations, espouse a different view.
The Council of the European Union has expressed its view regarding
the bilateral non-surrender agreements in a set of Guiding Principles
annexed to its Conclusions on the ICC, the first of which reads:
The US proposed agreements: Entering into US agreements - as presently
drafted - would be inconsistent with ICC States Parties' obligations with
regard to the ICC Statute and may be inconsistent with other international
55
agreements to which ICC States Parties are Parties ....

Not satisfied with the Council's position, the European Parliament
went further by asserting that state parties are obligated not to defeat
the Rome Statute's purpose, and are thus precluded from entering
into bilateral non-surrender agreements, even going so far as to say
that ratifying the assailed agreements would be incompatible with
EU membership.56

available at http://www.amicc.org/docs/powelll2 4_02.pdf (last visited Mar. 29,
2004).
54. David J. Scheffer, A Negotiator's Perspective on the International
Criminal Court, 167 MIL. L. REv. 1, 18 (2001).
55. Council of the European Union, Draft Council Conclusions on the
International Criminal Court (Sept. 30, 2002) [hereinafter Draft Conclusions],
available at http://www.amicc.org/docs/EC9-30-02.pdf (last visited Mar.19,
2004).
56. See European Parliament, European Parliament Resolution on the
InternationalCriminal Court (ICC), EUR. PARL. Doc. P5_TA-PROV 0049 (2002)
(stating that Article 86 of the Rome Statute prohibits states parties from entering
into
immunity
agreements),
available
at
http://www.amicc.org/docs/EPres9-26-02.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2004); see
also European Parliament Resolution on the General Affairs Council's Position
Concerning the International Criminal Court, EUR. PARL. Doc. P5_TA-PROV
0521 (2002) (explaining that ratifying an agreement which would undermine the
Rome Statute's effective implementation would be incompatible with membership
in the EU), available at http://www.amicc.org/docs/EUP10 24_02.pdf. (last
visited Mar. 19, 2004).
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Other states throughout the international community share
Europe's stand on bilateral non-surrender agreements. For example,
those states composing the Joint Parliamentary Assembly of the
African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States and the European
Union and its Member States ("ACP-EU") articulated their position
in the following Resolution, which expresses that each state
4. Recognises [sic] that the agreements proposed by the USA are contrary
to the Rome Statute and to the Treaty commitments of the EU Member
states; ....
6. Firmly believes that the ICC States Parties and Signatory States are
obliged under international law not to defeat the object and purpose of the
Rome Statute, under which, according to its Preamble, 'the most serious
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go
unpunished' and that States Parties are obliged to cooperate fully with the
Court, in accordance with Article 86 of the Rome Statute, thus preventing
them from entering into immunity agreements which remove certain
citizens from the States' or the ICC's jurisdictions, undermining the full
effectiveness of the ICC and jeopardizing [sic] its role as a
complementary jurisdiction to State jurisdictions and a building block in
57
collective global security ....

It is evident, then, that the swirl of arguments of the opposing
sides to this issue revolves around the effect a bilateral non-surrender
agreement would have on a state party's legal obligations under the
Rome Statute. 58 Specifically, the issue is whether a bilateral nonsurrender agreement would frustrate the object and purpose of the
Rome Statute.
Under international law, the Rome Statute's state parties "have an
obligation to each other not to act in such a way as to deprive a treaty
of its object and purpose, or to undermine its spirit. '59 Article 18 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties codifies this rule,
which requires states to refrain from acts that would defeat the object
and purpose of a treaty.60
57. ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution on the International
Criminal Court (ICC), ACP-EU Res. 3560/03/fin (2003), available at
http://www.amicc.org/docs/ACP-EUres.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2004).
58. See, e.g., Eubany, supra note 39, at 125-26 (discussing how bilateral nonsurrender agreements frustrate the Rome Statute's purpose).
59. Crawford, supra note 45, at 11.
60. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, openedfor signature May
23, 1969, art. 18, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (1980)
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It is widely accepted that the Rome Statute's object and purpose is
to put an end to the regime of impunity that protects the perpetrators
of all the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community within the jurisdiction of the ICC. 6 I The fifth and sixth

paragraphs of the Preamble to the Rome Statute codify this principle:
Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective
prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and
by enhancing international cooperation,
Determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes
62
and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes ....

Putting effective arrangements in place to prevent impunity for the
crimes over which the ICC will have jurisdiction serves these goals.
"[T]he entire system is predicated on the voluntary cooperation of
States in ensuring compliance with the orders of the [ICC]." 63 This
includes "surrendering fugitives, obtaining and securing evidence,
seizing and freezing assets and other forms of international
cooperation. "64
The decision by states to enter into a bilateral non-surrender
agreement, such as the one entered into by the governments of the
United States and the Philippines, creates very specific
consequences.65 In a typical bilateral non-surrender agreement, the
[hereinafter Vienna Convention] (explaining that once a state signs a treaty and
expresses its consent to be bound by the treaty, the state is obligated not to take
action that would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty).
61. See Crawford, supra note 45, at 12 (indicating that the Rome Statute's
purpose is to prevent crimes over which the ICC has jurisdiction); see also
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Declarationby the EU on the
Positionof the U.S. Towards the InternationalCriminal Court 5 (May 13, 2002)
(noting the Rome Statute's purpose of ensuring that persons suspected of
committing serious international crimes are properly investigated), available at
http://www.amicc.org/docs/EUdec5- 3-02.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2004).
62. Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl.
63. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The International Criminal Court in Historical
Context, 99 ST. Louis WARSAW-TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 55 (1999).
64. Id.
65. See Surrender Agreement, supra note 35 (establishing that the United
States and the Philippines will not surrender or transfer an individual to an
international tribunal).
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contracting parties bind themselves not to surrender, transfer, or
consent to the surrender or transfer of certain defined persons of one
party to any international tribunal.66Clearly, a signatory or state party
to the Rome Statute that enters into such an agreement would already
be in violation of its obligations under international law by virtue of
this first covenant alone, for the Rome Statute provides:
Article 89: Surrender of persons to the Court

1. The Court may transmit a request for the arrest and surrender of a
person, together with the material supporting the request outlined in
article 91, to any State on the territory of which that person may be found

and shall request the cooperation of that State in the arrest and surrender

of such a person. States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of
this Part and the procedure
67 under their national law, comply with requests
for arrest and surrender.

In construing this provision, parties must interpret it "in good faith
in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. '"68
Having thus cast the Rome Statute in the proper light, juxtaposing its
applicable provisions with those of a typical bilateral non-surrender
agreement leads to no other conclusion than that the agreements
create an avenue for impunity. By promising not to surrender,
transfer, or consent to the surrender or transfer of particular classes
of people to an international tribunal, which the ICC most definitely
is, a state thereby imbues those persons with a level of immunity it
does not afford to everyone else.
There are no mechanisms in the bilateral non-surrender
agreements designed to ensure that the persons whose surrender or
transfer an international tribunal is pursuing are subject to
investigation - much less prosecution by another competent authority
- for the alleged commission of any act that may constitute a crime
punishable by the Rome Statute. Its substantive provisions are geared
towards the end goal of depriving a specific body of jurisdiction over
66. See id. 1 (defining persons as "current or former government officials,
employees, (including contractors), military personnel, or nationals of one of the
contracting parties").
67. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 89(1).
68. See Vienna Convention, supra note 60, art. 31 (explaining how to interpret
a treaty so as avoid defeating its objects and purposes).
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certain persons; it does not vest jurisdiction in anyone else, not even
the sending state or state native to the persons in question. 69 At most,
bilateral non-surrender agreements, and the Agreement Regarding
the Surrender of Persons to International Tribunals ("Surrender
Agreement") in particular, merely note that the contracting state
parties "have each expressed their intention to, where appropriate,
investigate and prosecute war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide alleged to have been committed" by the subject persons.70 It
is by virtue of this glaring omission that impunity becomes the order
of the day.
Therefore, any signatory or state party to the Rome Statute that
enters into a bilateral non-surrender agreement, such as the one the
United States and the Philippines entered into, would be materially
aiding or contributing to a scheme of impunity as it pertains to the
obligation to give effect to the jurisdiction of the ICC.7 1 For a
signatory or state party to the Rome Statute, such an integral role in
an arrangement that results in impunity for those crimes covered by
the Rome Statute necessarily renders said signatory or state party in
breach of its obligation to refrain from acts that would defeat the
object and purpose of the Rome Statute.72 The following Resolution
of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
authoritatively echoes these conclusions:
8. The Assembly regrets the ongoing campaign by the United States to
convince State Parties to the Rome Statute, including member states of
the Council of Europe, to enter into bilateral agreements aimed at
subjecting these states' cooperation with the ICC, as regards United States

69. See FtDtRATION INTERNATIONALE DES LIGUES DES DROITS DE L'HOMME,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (ICC): No To AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM 4

(Dec. 2002) [hereinafter FEDRATION] (discussing the complementarity concept
and how it diminishes any need for bilateral "impunity" agreements by requiring
states who wish to exclude their nationals from the Court's jurisdiction to simply
available
at
national
law),
them
at
prosecute
http://www.amicc.org/docs/FIDHUS.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2004).
70. Surrender Agreement, supra note 35.
3-4 (establishing the willingness of both parties to refuse to
71. See id.
surrender an individual from either country to any international tribunal absent the
express consent of the governments of the other country).
72. See Crawford, supra note 45, at 22-24 (discussing the compatibility of state
obligations created under the Rome Statute with bilateral non-surrender
agreements).
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citizens accused of crimes giving rise to the jurisdiction of the ICC, to
prior agreement by the United States government.
9. The Assembly considers such agreements to be violations of the Rome
Statute of the ICC (in particular Articles 27 and 86, Article 98 (2)
allowing only narrowly defined exemptions in the framework of status of
force agreements), and of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(Article 18), according to which states must refrain from any action
which
73
would not be consistent with the object and purpose of a treaty.

Note, however, that by the terms of our model bilateral nonsurrender agreement, it is incorrect to characterize the United States
as standing in breach of its international obligations, seeing as it is
not a state party to the Rome Statute and does not consider itself
bound by its signature thereto.74 However, it is important to further
note that the Rome Statute codifies the duty to cooperate in the
detection, arrest, extradition, and prosecution of persons accused of
war crimes and crimes against humanity, as they have been
understood under customary international law. 75 This is also true of
all members of the United Nations: evidently, the refusal by states to
cooperate in the arrest, extradition, trial, and punishment of persons
guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity is contrary to
generally recognized norms of international law.76 The U.N. General
Assembly expressed the same sentiments in the following
declaration:
3. States shall co-operate with each other on a bilateral and multilateral
basis with a view to halting and preventing war crimes and crimes against

73. Counsel of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Threats to the International
Criminal
Court,
EUR.
PARL.
Res.
1336
(2003),
available at
http://www.amicc.org/docs/COE1336.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2004).
74. See Crawford, supra note 45, at 3 (suggesting that the United States does
not have an obligation to refrain from acts that would defeat the purpose of the
Rome statute since the United States does not intend to ratify or become a party to
the treaty).
75. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 86 (stating that states parties have a
general obligation to cooperate with the court).
76. See George William Mugwanya, Expunging the Ghost of Impunity for
Severe and Gross Violations of Human Rights and the Commission of Delicti Jus
Gentium: A Case for the Domestication of International Criminal Law and the
Establishment of a Strong Permanent International Criminal Court, 8 MICH. ST.
U. C. L. J. INT'L L. 701, 757, 759, 778 (1999) (commenting that international
norms prevent the international community from negating criminal responsibility
of any individual).
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humanity, and shall take the domestic and international measures
necessary for that purpose.
4. States shall assist each other in detecting, arresting and bringing to trial
persons suspected of having committed such crimes and, if they are found
guilty, in punishing them.
5. Persons against whom there is evidence that they have committed war
crimes and crimes against humanity shall be subject to trial and, if found
guilty, to punishment as a general rule in the country in which they
committed those crimes. In that connection, states shall co-operate on
questions of extraditing such persons .... 77

The following provision from the same resolution is of particular
significance, in that it specifically proscribes the resort by any state
to measures that may be prejudicial to the obligations they take on
under the United Nations:
8. States shall not take any legislative or other measures which may be
prejudicial to the international obligations they have assumed in regard to
the detection, arrest, extradition and punishment of persons guilty of war
crimes and crimes against humanity. 7

Thus, the obligation to cooperate in the suppression of at least two
of the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute has attached
both to state parties to the Rome Statute and to non-state parties that
are members of the United Nations. They are also obligated to refrain
from acts that would be contrary to the United Nations' declared
principles regarding the suppression of these crimes.79 Some have
submitted that the General Assembly's declaration impliedly reflects
a general expectation that it would be appropriate for states to create
bilateral or multilateral institutional processes to assist in prosecuting
such international crimes, and that such action might be required as
part of the duty to engage in bilateral and multilateral cooperative
efforts to halt, prevent, and prosecute such crimes.80
77. G.A. Res. 3074, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 79, U.N. Doc.
http://ods-ddsat
available
(1973),
A/9326
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GENNRO/281/46/IMG/NR028146.pdf (last visited
Mar. 19, 2004).
78. Id.
79. See id. (establishing that States will cooperate with each other in the
collection of information and evidence, and will not take any legal actions to
interfere with international obligations).
80. See id. at 79 (asserting that states must work together to halt and prevent
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Furthermore, observers have submitted that the ICC's exercise of
universal jurisdiction over those crimes the Rome Statute proscribes
has achieved the status of customary international law, for neither the
international community nor any state nor group of states can validly
negate the criminal responsibility of any individual who has
committed international crimes.81 Adherents to that position argue
that, consequently, the practice of granting immunities to
transgressors, as well as refusing to cooperate with other states in the
noble endeavor to deal with these crimes, are breaches of
international obligations.82 Nevertheless, the mischief that a nonsignatory, non-party to a treaty can cause to the ability of signatories
and state parties to comply in good faith with their international
obligations under said treaty has never been more pronounced and
alarming.83

war crimes); see also G.A. Res. 2840, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at
88, U.N. Doc. A/8592 (1971) (urging states to take measures to cooperate in
ending war crimes and crimes against humanity); G.A. Res. 96, U.N. GAOR, 1st
Sess., at 188, U.N. Doc. A/64 (1946) (recommending international cooperation
between states to expedite the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide,
a crime against humanity).
81. See discussion infra Part V.D.1 (explaining the effects of universal
jurisdiction and that its purpose is to "enhance world order" by holding those who
have committed certain crimes accountable); see also Mugwanya, supra note 76, at
757-58 (noting that if states indeed were to try to deny the criminal responsibility
of an individual, this would run contrary to the principles of criminal responsibility
recognized by customary international law).
82. See generally Mugwanya, supra note 76, at 757, 759 (noting that customary
international law would prohibit the international community, states, and groups of
states from dismissing the culpability specifically of an individual who has
violated human rights or committed certain "core universal crimes"). The fact that
the crimes punished under the Rome Statute fall under both of these categories
makes his discussion on the obligations of non-party States in general especially
applicable to non-parties to the Rome Statute. Id.
83. See FtDtRATION, supra note 69, at 6-11 (discussing the different U.S.
legislation that interferes with the ability of signatories to comply with treaty
obligations).
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D. STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENTS AND ARTICLE 98(2) OF THE
ROME STATUTE

Questions have arisen regarding the nature of the "international
agreements" contemplated by Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute. 4
Given the vastly different interpretations by both sides to the issue,

international law allows recourse to the travauxpreparatoiresbehind
the formulation of this contentious provision; indeed, an
interpretation that allows a non-state party to the Rome Statute to
subvert the object and purpose of the Rome Statute would be
manifestly absurd and unreasonable, prompting resort to such
supplementary means of interpretation.85
Preliminarily, a review of the available commentaries will reveal
that there is growing support for the contention that the international
agreements in Article 98(2) refer to status of forces agreements
("SOFAs"). 86 These are "international agreements between states that
create obligations concerning the jurisdiction over a foreign state's
military or civilian citizen."87 SOFAs were developed in particular to
define the legal rights and responsibilities of military forces stationed
on foreign soil.88 Generally, "the government that sent the troops
legally retains criminal jurisdiction over their soldiers and they are

84. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 98(2) (stating that the Court cannot
request a surrender of an individual that would require a state to act inconsistently
with its international obligations).
85. See Vienna Convention, supra note 60, art. 32 (allowing recourse to the
preparatory work of a treaty when interpretation of the treaty otherwise leaves the
meaning unclear or leads to a result that is absurd or unreasonable).
86. See Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 22, 41 (1999) (reiterating that the second
paragraph of Article 98 concerns SOFAs); see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal
Jurisdictionfor InternationalCrimes: HistoricalPerspectives and Contemporary
Practice,42 VA. J. INT'L L. 81, 86 (2001) (noting that the language of Article 98
applies to SOFAs); Gennady M. Danilenko, The Statute of the International
Criminal Court and Third States, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 445, 471 (2000) (explaining
that Article 98(2) refers to host states' obligations under SOFAs).
87. Erik Rosenfeld, Application of U.S. Status of Forces Agreements to Article
98 of the Rome Statute, 2 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 273, 280 (2003).
88. See id. (emphasizing that SOFAs were created to respond to the problem of
how customary international law would apply to criminal jurisdiction over visiting
forces).
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subject to the jurisdiction of the host government."8 9 In situations
wherein there is, technically, no host state to negotiate with, states
have had occasion to enter into peacekeeping SOFAs with the United
Nations itself; for example, the peacekeeping forces in East Timor
and Kosovo have operated under such agreements.9"
However, some authorities espouse an even narrower
interpretation of the coverage of Article 98(2). Various articles have
cited as authority some commentaries by participants in the U.N.
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries that state that only
SOFAs existing at the time of the signing or ratification of the Rome
Statute enjoy the status of international agreements as contemplated
by Article 98(2).91 Some assert that the idea behind Article 98(2) was
to solve legal conflicts that might arise because of SOFAs that were
already in place, and that "Article 98(2) was not designed to create
an incentive for (future) States Parties to conclude [SOFAs] which
amount to an obstacle to the execution of requests for cooperation
92
issued by the [ICC].
Unfortunately, the only thing all these commentators have
succeeded in establishing is that there is no consensus regarding the
original intent behind this provision. It does not appear that a clear
majority of participating states in the U.N. Diplomatic Conference of

89. Lee, supra note 47, at 760.
90. See Frederick Rawski, To Waive or Not To Waive: Immunity and
Accountability in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations, 18 CONN. J. INT'L L. 103, 108

(2002) (asserting that the sending States retain the authority to waive the
guarantees of immunity in the agreements for Kosovo and East Timor).
91. See Kimberly Prost & Angelika Schlunck, Article 98, in COMMENTARY ON
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS'
NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 1131 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999) (discussing the

protections arising from Article 98 and agreements such as SOFAs); see also
Christopher Keith Hall, The First Five Sessions of the UN Preparatory
Commission for the InternationalCriminal Court, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 773, 786 n.

36 (2000) (stating that it was at the initiative of the United States that parties added
Article 98(2) to the Rome Statute); Ruth Wedgwood, The InternationalCriminal
Court: An American View, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 93, 103 (1999) (noting that the

conference bureau's interpretation of Article 98 requires respect for new and
existing SOFAs).
92. Hans-Peter Kaul & Claus Kress, Jurisdiction and Cooperation in the
Statute of the International Criminal Court: Principles and Compromises, 2 Y.B.
INT'L HUM. L. 143, 165 (1999).
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Plenipotentiaries favored limiting the notion of international
agreements in Article 98(2) to SOFAs, much less to SOFAs existing
at the time of signing or ratification. 93
Still others contend that even the term "sending state" used in
Article 98(2) is a term of art used primarily in SOFAs. 94 These
commentators claim that the use of this allegedly technical term
leads to no other conclusion except that Article 98(2) refers
exclusively to SOFAs. 95 This contention is unconvincing.
Individuals must remember that "a treaty shall be interpreted in
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object
and purpose. 96 Thus, individuals cannot help but take note of the
fact that the term "sending state" does not appear to be exclusively
used in the formulation of SOFAs.
Even a cursory review of our basic texts in public international
law will reveal that the term appears in other areas thereof, most
notably in the field of diplomatic and consular relations. 97 What the
93. See Crawford, supra note 45, at 18, (indicating that there is no evidence
suggesting that Article 98(2) is "limited to agreements that existed at the time of
signing (or ratification) of the Rome Statute"); see also Hall, supra note 91, at 786
n.36 (explaining that Article 98(2) of the Statute was meant to apply to SOFAs and
other agreements); Kaul & Kress, supra note 92, at 165 (pointing out that the idea
behind Article 98(2) differs from its actual use, because it was not meant to
encourage the creation of further SOFAs).
94. See Legal Service of the EU Commission, Effective Functioning of the
International Criminal Court (ICC) Undermined by Bilateral Immunity
Agreements as Proposed by the U.S.! Internal Opinion of the Legal Service of the
EU Commission 158 (2002) [hereinafter EU Commission] (noting that the term
"sending State" is not used nor defined anywhere else in the Statute, and it is a
at
from
SOFAs),
available
technical
term
taken
http://www.amicc.org/docs/EUILegalServiceinternal.pdf (last visited Mar. 19,
2004).
95. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 49, at 7 (explaining that "sending State"
appears almost exclusively in SOFAs); see also EU Commission, supra note 94, at
158 (concluding that, because Article 98(2) has a very specific definition, the term
was only meant to apply to SOFAs).
96. Vienna Convention, supra note 60, art. 31(1).
97. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 3, 500
U.N.T.S. 95, 96 (using the term "sending State" within the treaty, without mention
of SOFAs); see also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
352-67 (5th ed. 1998) (illustrating that the term "sending State" appears in the
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ordinary meaning of this wording does suggest is that a person's
presence on the requested state's territory must originate from a
sending state's act.98 Thus, it is the circumstances leading to a
person's presence on the territory of the requested state party, and
not the status of the person or the activity he or she performs in said
state, which is determinative of whether or not said person falls
within the exception provided in Article 98(2). 99 The Council of the
European Union espoused substantially the same view in the Guiding
Principles annexed to its Conclusions on the ICC, the pertinent
portion of which reads, "[a]ny solution should cover only persons
present on the territory of a requested State because they have been
sent by a sending State, cf. Article 98, paragraph 2 of the Rome
Statute." 100 In doing so, the Council substantially adopted the same
view as previously mentioned.
E.RULE 195(2) OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE OF
THE ROME STATUTE
Rule 195(2) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Rome
Statute provides:
[T]he Court may not proceed with a request for the surrender of a person
without the consent of a sending state if, under article 98, paragraph 2,
such a request would be inconsistent with obligations under an
international agreement pursuant to which the consent of a sending state
01

is required prior to the surrender of a person of that State to the Court.'

Former U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes, David
Scheffer, has maintained that a state is able to enter into a nonVienna Convention).
98. See Crawford, supra note 45, at 20 (commenting on how the term "sending

State" limits the scope of the agreements, in that the person must have been "sent"
by the state, and that thus the circumstances surrounding his or her presence in the

territory are important).
99. See id. (noting that these people typically have a certain status and perform

a specific activity, for example, a government minister, an ambassador, or a
soldier).
100. Draft Conclusions, supra note 55.
101. Ruth Wedgwood, The United States and the InternationalCriminal Court:
the Irresolution of Rome, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 193, 207 n.57 (2001)
(citing the FinalizedDraft Text of the Rules of Procedureand Evidence, U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/2001/1/Add.1 (Nov. 2,2000)).
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surrender agreement directly with the ICC. °2 Scheffer asserts that
this rule, the adoption of which the United States successfully
negotiated at the session of the Preparatory Commission for the
International Criminal Court ("Preparatory Commission") on June
29, 2000, gives rise to the possibility of entering into an accord with
the ICC itself which would ensure that the United States would not
surrender any U.S. citizen.l° 3
However, it was precisely this interpretation that an overwhelming
majority of states participating in the Preparatory Commission
specifically objected to."0 4 They "agreed that Article 98(2) was
intended to address a limited scenario in which a sending State has
an agreement with a requested State that requires the prior consent of
the sending State before its citizen is surrendered to the ICC."'0 5 In
reaching a consensus regarding the adoption of the text of Rule
195(2), the German delegation insisted that the following proviso be
included in the Proceedings of the Preparatory Commission: "[i]t is
generally understood that Rule 195(2) should not be interpreted as
requiring or in any way calling for the negotiation of provisions in
any particular international agreement by the Court or by any other
international organization or State." 0 6
After the parties reached consensus on this compromise, Professor
Roger Clark of the Samoan delegation pointed out that Article 98
was intended to include only agreements between states. 0 7 He
stressed this point when he stated that "I am comforted by the
102. See Scheffer, supra note 54, at 18 (explaining that Rule 195(2) offers the
possibility for non-surrender agreements directly with the Court).
103. See David J. Scheffer, Staying the Course with the InternationalCriminal
Court, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 47, 90, 96-97 (Nov. 2001/Feb. 2002) (noting that the
United States delegation's proposal regarding Rule 195(2) affords such immunity,

consistent with international law).
104. See Hall, supra note 91, at 786 (commenting that many delegations were
unhappy with the proposed interpretation).
105. Chimene Keitner, Comment, Crafting the International Criminal Court:
Trials and Tribulations in Article 98(2), 6 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 215,
251 (2001).
106. Hall, supra note 91, at 786.
107. See Keitner, supra note 105, at 255-56 (emphasizing that Clark's assertion

that Article 98(2) refers only to SOFAs is imperative, and that this obligation
cannot be changed except by official amendment).
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proviso, which provides that this rule is not in any way-two
words-requiring or calling for, and does not authorize, permit, or
empower a wide range of such agreements to be decided on another
day. "108
In the end, consistency with the principles of the Rome Statute
remains mandatory, so that Article 98(2) does not and cannot limit
the ICC's jurisdiction beyond what the parties envisaged and agreed
to in Rome.' 0 9 Hence, despite the unfortunate wording of Rule
195(2), there is sufficient authority to state that the terms
"international agreement" used in Article 98(2) refer to agreements
entered into between states, and cannot include agreements entered
into between or including international organizations.°10
F. VOLUNTARY SURRENDER OR TRANSFER AND BILATERAL NONSURRENDER AGREEMENTS

The typical bilateral non-surrender agreement prohibits a
contracting state party not only from surrendering, but also from
transferring, by any means, any current or former government
officials, employees (including contractors), military personnel, or
nationals of the other contracting state party to any international
tribunal for any purpose, unless the U.N. Security Council
established the tribunal."' Hence, a bilateral non-surrender
agreement could even preclude a non-party national from
surrendering voluntarily to the ICC, an unprecedented restriction on
the possibility of self-surrender.1 Evidently, a state party to the
Rome Statute that enters into a bilateral non-surrender agreement

108. Id.
109. See id. at 253 (commenting that adherence to the principles of the Rome

Statute remains mandatory, and that documentation and clarification of the
circumstances of the adoptive process is important to forestall future confusion as
to the imperatives of the Statute).
110. See EU Commission, supra note 94, at 159 (noting not only that Article
98(2) applies exclusively to SOFAs, but, more narrowly, only to SOFAs between
parties to the Statute).

111. See supra Part III (explaining that such bilateral agreements protect, for
example, U.S. citizens from foreign courts when in other countries).
112. See Keitner, supra note 105, at 254 (commenting on the obligations that
may arise from bilateral or multilateral agreements).
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would thus undoubtedly violate its general obligation to cooperate
fully with the ICC in its investigation and prosecution of crimes
within the jurisdiction of the ICC as codified in Article 86 of the
Rome Statute. Furthermore, state parties and non-parties to the Rome
Statute that enter into bilateral non-surrender agreements would
contravene the declaration of the U.N. General Assembly regarding
international cooperation in the halting and prevention of war crimes
as well as crimes against humanity.' 13
Access to witnesses would also suffer, because even if a person is
willing to assist the ICC in the fair determination of guilt and
innocence, their own government would prohibit them from
114
exercising their right to testify in the cause of international justice.
Thus, a state party to the Rome Statute that enters into a bilateral
non-surrender agreement would also be violating its specific duty to
facilitate the voluntary appearance of persons as witnesses or experts
before the ICC, as provided for in Article 93(l)(e) of the Rome
Statute.115 Of course, it is difficult to overstate the importance of
cooperation among state parties to the Rome Statute, specifically in
the area of acquiring jurisdiction over indicted persons, judging from
the experience of previously established international criminal
tribunals." 6 The failure to make arrests undermined the credibility of
113. See Jordan J. Paust, The Reach of ICC Jurisdiction Over Non-Signatory
Nationals, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 4-5 (2000) (discussing the U.N. General
Assembly's conclusion that states shall cooperate with each other and take all

measures necessary for this purpose).
114. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 49, at 23 (discussing the U.S.' ability to
prevent persons from appearing as witnesses before the ICC, even if the person
consents to assist the Court).
115. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 93(1)(e) (recognizing the facilitation of
the voluntary appearance of witnesses before the Court as a form of cooperation
under the Rome Statute).
116. See Michael P. Scharf, The Tools for Enforcing International Criminal
Justice in the New Millennium: Lessons from the Yugoslavia Tribunal,49 DEPAUL
L. REV. 925, 927, 944, 978 (2000) (discussing the difficulties in establishing
international judicial systems that effectuate real change without a self-contained
enforcement mechanism, and noting that the ICC must rely on cooperation by the
international community as a result of its lack of any such provision for direct
enforcement). But see Marieke L. Wierda, What Lessons can be Learnedfrom the
Ad Hoc Criminal Tribunals?, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L -L. & POL'Y 13, 17 (2002)
(arguing that the development of international systems capable of addressing mass
crime are viable and are taking root).
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the ICTY, while the superior credibility of the ICTR is due to its

ability to gain jurisdiction over persons it indicts. 1 7

IV. ALTERNATIVES TO BILATERAL NONSURRENDER AGREEMENTS
Having one's nationals hauled before the ICC is undoubtedly a
diplomatically embarrassing and politically-damaging prospect for
any state. Therefore, the desire of states to obtain exemption, if not
outright immunity, for their nationals from the jurisdiction of the
ICC is understandable. This is so even if the international community
perceives such moves as arrogant and outright unsportsmanlike.
However, one hopes that any state that finds itself in this situation
will opt instead to utilize legal measures that are palatable to the
international community. 18

A. THE U.N. CHARTER
In the
the U.N.
all U.N.
member

absence of specific agreements or grants, parties often cite
Charter as a basis for granting fundamental immunities to
personnel.1 1 9 It provides that representatives of the U.N.
states and U.N. officials shall enjoy the privileges and

immunities that are necessary for the independent exercise of their

117. See Scharf, supra note 116, at 977 (commenting that NATO and the
ICTY's failure to arrest Bosnian war criminals has compromised the credibility of
those organizations); see also James Blount Griffin, A Predictive Frameworkfor
the Effectiveness of InternationalCriminal Tribunals, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
405, 445 (2001) (analyzing the factors that determine the effectiveness of
international criminal tribunals, and specifically discussing the conviction success
of the ICTR and the ICTY).
118. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER arts. 92-96 (establishing various provisions which
treat the International Court of Justice, as well as other tribunals, as the principal
judicial organ of the United Nations, which may be used to solve differences
between members).
119. See Rawski, supra note 90, at 106-07 (noting that the U.N. Charter affords
certain immunities, and that they are intended to foster the efficient operations of
an organization); see also Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., Protecting the Avatars of
InternationalPeace and Security, 7 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 93, 127 (1996)
(describing how immunities can create a conflict of interests between the United
Nations and receiving states, and noting how Article 105 of the U.N. Charter
balances the two).
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U.N.-connected functions. 2 ° Article 105 outlines what commentators
have come to refer to as the principle of functional necessity of
immunity and privileges.' 2 ' The grant of protection under this
principle depends upon whether or not a particular act is "necessary
for the independent exercise of their functions.' 2 2
These provisions apply uncontrovertibly to troops working under
the command and control of the United Nations in what observers
often refer to as a "blue-helmet" operation.'
These protections
extend specifically to U.N. troops that are part of either a nonbelligerent consensual force or non-belligerent force acting under the
coercive authority of the Security Council. 124 Additionally, the
protection of Article 105 of the U.N. Charter encompass forces
operating under U.N. authority by relating the same to the statutory
duty of states to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security
Council, 25 as well as the implied power of the United Nations to
provide its agents with adequate protection.

120. See U.N. CHARTER art. 105, para. 2 (declaring that representatives of
member states enjoy immunity to the extent necessary to perform their duties
within the organization).
121. See Sharp, supra note 119, at 128 (discussing the Privileges and
Immunities Convention and positing that it enjoys international acceptance as a
grant of absolute immunity where U.N. property, funds, and assets are concerned);
see also Rawski, supra note 90, at 111 (noting the limited immunity of U.N.
civilian staff, and mentioning the ability of the organization to also protect locallyrecruited staff).
122. See Rawski, supra note 90, at 111-12 (commenting on the interpretation of
whether a function is "official," and noting how a narrow construction provides
more limited protection).
123. See id. at 110 (recognizing that blue-helmet soldiers receive absolute
immunity because their duties are de facto official).
124. See Sharp, supra note 119, at 127, 136-38 (emphasizing that all U.N.
member nations must accept that personnel on blue-helmet operations enjoy these
privileges and immunities because such operations are necessary to fulfill the
mandate of the Security Council).
125. See U.N. CHARTER art. 25 (providing that the decisions of the Security
Council are binding on all members, and granting privileges to personnel acting
under this authority).
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B. THE CONVENTION ON THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE
UNITED NATIONS.

In the past, the U.N. Secretary-General recognized the status of
personnel operating under a U.N. mandate as "experts on mission"
for the United Nations, as defined by the Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations ("Privileges and
Immunities Convention") adopted by the General Assembly on
February 13, 1946.116 Article VI, section 22 of the Privileges and
Immunities Convention lays out the scope of the protection afforded
these individuals.
Experts (other than officials coming within the scope of Article V)
performing missions for the United Nations shall enjoy such
privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent
exercise of their functions during the period of their missions,
including the time spent on journeys in connection with their
missions. In particular, they shall enjoy:
(a) immunity from personal arrest or detention and from seizure of their
personal baggage;
(b) in respect of words spoken or written and acts done by them in the
course of the performance of their mission, immunity from legal process
of every kind. This immunity from legal process shall continue to be
accorded notwithstanding that the persons concerned are no longer
employed on missions for the United Nations .... 127
Moreover, these provisions not only shield personnel classified as
experts on mission from the jurisdiction of certain courts, but accord
actual immunity for acts done pursuant to their duty. 128 However, that
grant of immunity depends upon whether one interprets the

126. See Sharp, supra note 119, at 129 (discussing the Convention and its
establishment of different levels of privileges depending on the role of the party
operating under U.N. authority).
127. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, art. VI
(Feb. 13, 1946) [hereinafter Privileges and Immunities Convention],
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/decade/decad035.htm (last visited Mar. 18,
2004).
128. See Sharp, supra note 119, at 129-30 (noting the total immunity granted to
experts while in the course of their official duties).
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provisions to grant immunity for all "official" activities, or for all
activities that are both "official" and "necessary."' 2 9

Of course, because the Secretary-General may only confer this
status with a positive act, whether or not there exists a grant of
protection depends upon a case-by-case basis. For example, the
Secretary-General accorded the status of experts to U.S. aircrews
flying missions in support of the United Nations Protective Force
("UNPF") in the former Yugoslavia and the technical experts
providing integrated logistics support to the Rapid Reaction Force of
the UNPF.'30 It is significant to note that the Privileges and
Immunities Convention provides that the Secretary-General has the
right and duty to waive the immunity of any expert in any case
where, in his opinion, the immunity would impede the course of
justice.'31 However, the Secretary-General may only waive such
immunity if it will not prejudice the interests of the United
Nations.132
C. RESOLUTIONS OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL

Invoking its authority under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter to
deal with threats to peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of
aggression, the U.N. Security Council has issued resolutions leading
to immunity from prosecution, in varying degrees, for U.N.
personnel. One recent example of this is Resolution 1487 (2003),
involving the status of U.N. personnel conducting operations related
to the entry into force of the Rome Statute. The Resolution provides:

129. See Rawski, supra note 90, at 111 (arguing that this interpretive question
creates a circumstance where prosecution is possible only if the Secretary-General
waives the privilege, which amounts to a default to absolute immunity, thereby
undermining the concept of functional necessity).
130. See Sharp, supra note 119, at 129 (noting the role of the Secretary-General
in conferring immunity from judicial proceedings on U.N. personnel).
131. See Privileges and Immunities Convention, supra note 127, arts. V-VI, §§
20 & 23 (stating that the Secretary-General has the "right and duty" to waive
prosecutorial immunity as it applies to U.N. officials where such a grant would
obstruct the course of justice).
132. See id. (explaining that privileges and immunities of U.N. officials may be
waived by the Secretary-General when they impede the pursuit of justice, but only
provided such a waiver would not have a prejudicial effect on U.N. interests).
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The Security Council,
1. Requests, consistent with the provisions of Article 16 of the Rome
Statute, that the ICC, if a case arises involving current or former officials
or personnel from a contributing state not a Party to the Rome Statute
over acts or omissions relating to a United Nations established or
authorized operation, shall for a twelve-month period starting 1 July 2002
not commence or proceed with investigation or prosecution of any such
case, unless the Security Council decides otherwise;
2. Expresses the intention to renew the request in paragraph 1 under the
same conditions each 1 July for further 12-month periods for as long as
may be necessary .... 133

Thus, the Security Council exercised its exclusive power in
requesting that the ICC defer investigation or prosecution for a
period of twelve months of any case arising under the Rome Statute
for the benefit of officials and personnel of contributing states not
parties to the Rome Statute. Many nations and organizations
disapproved of this action.13 4 The Security Council renewed this

133. S.C. Res. 1422, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4572d mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1422 (2002).
134. See Letter from Kofi Annan, Secretary-General, United Nations, to Colin
Powell, Secretary of State, United States (July 3, 2002) (expressing concern that
the United States' refusal to join the ICC will undermine the Rome Statute),
availableat http://www.amicc.org/docs/SG-to SS.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2004);
see also Letter from the Ambassadors of New Zealand, South Africa, Brazil and
Canada, to H.E. Sir Jeremy Greenstock, President of the U.N. Security Council
(July 12, 2002), in relation to the Draft Resolution S/2002/747 (arguing that
allowing peace-keepers from non-signatory States to commit crimes without fear
of punishment under the Rome Statute undermines the ICC's purpose), available
at http://www.amicc.org/docs/Joint-letter-toSC-July_12.pdf (last visited Mar.
20, 2004); U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Draft Report of the SubCommission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 54th Sess., 18th
mtg., at 8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/L. 11 (2002) (noting the Human Rights
Committee's disapproval of the immunity granted to parties not signatories to the
Rome Statute), available at http://www.amicc.org/docs/SubComm.pdf (last visited
Mar. 20, 2004); Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, DeclarationBy
the Presidency on Behalf of the European Union on the Position of the U.S.
Towards the International Criminal Court (May 13, 2002) (conveying the
European Union's disappointment with the United States' decision not to ratify the
Rome Statute), available at http://www.amicc.org/docs/EUdec5 13 02.pdf (last
visited Mar. 20, 2004); FEDERATION, supra note 69 (rejecting America's refusal to
submit to the jurisdiction of the ICC, and attacking American policy).
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request on July 1, 2003, with Resolution 1487 (2003).135
The Security Council may delegate the power to modify the status
of personnel working under U.N.-established or authorized
operations to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.13 6
For example, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in
Kosovo ("UNMIK"), which issued UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/47,
outlined the privileges granted for the U.N. action in Kosovo. 13 7 The

regulation provides:
2.3 Locally recruited KFOR personnel shall be immune from legal
process in respect of words spoken or written and acts performed by them
in carrying out tasks exclusively related to their services to KFOR.
2.4 KFOR personnel other than those covered under section 2.3 above
shall be: immune from jurisdiction before courts in Kosovo in respect of
any administrative, civil or criminal act committed by them in the
territory of Kosovo. Such personnel shall be subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of their respective sending states; and immune from any form
of arrest or detention other than by persons acting on behalf of their
respective sending states. If erroneously detained, they shall be
138
immediately turned over to KFOR authorities.

"KFOR" refers to the specially-constituted force composed of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO"), its member states, its
subsidiary bodies, its military headquarters
and national
elements/units, and non-NATO contributing countries. In contrast to
the type of immunity that personnel classified as experts on mission

enjoy, these provisions merely insulate personnel serving with the

135. See S.C. Res. 1487, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4772d mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1487 (2003) (recognizing the adoption of the Rome Statute and agreeing
not to prosecute non-signatory nations for a twelve-month period).
136. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4011th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1244 (1999) (requesting the Secretary-General to act through his Special
Representative to coordinate an international presence in Kosovo).
137. See Bernard Kouchner, Special Representative to the Secretary-General,
On the Status, Privileges and Immunities of KFOR and UNMIK and Their
Personnel in Kosovo, UNMIK Reg. No. 2000/47 (2000) (describing the privileges
and immunities granted through the Secretary-General's Special Representative for
the U.N. mission to Kosovo), http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2000/reg4700.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2004).
138. Id. § 2.3-2.4.
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KFOR from the jurisdiction of courts in Kosovo;

13 9

exclusive

jurisdiction over these individuals continues to exist in their
respective sending states, much like under status of forces
agreements. UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/47 also vests in the
Secretary-General the right and duty to waive immunity to UNMIK
and KFOR personnel in terms identical to those found in the
140
Privileges and Immunities Convention.
D. STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENTS
1. SOFAs in General
"If SOFAs are designed to guarantee immunity from prosecution
for the most serious international crimes, then they may be deemed
invalid as violating jus cogens norms that prohibit war crimes,
genocide, and crimes against humanity."' 14 1 A state party to the Rome
Statute that later enters into an agreement that has or may have the
effect of granting immunity to persons normally within the
jurisdiction of the ICC from prosecution in either international or
domestic fora contradicts its obligation not to deprive the Rome
Statute of its object and purpose. Such an agreement would not be
compatible with said state's obligations under the Rome Statute, both
to other state parties and to the ICC. 142 Also, said agreement may be
incompatible with said state's general duty under international law
and specific treaties to investigate and, if warranted, to prosecute
international crimes.

43

139. See id. § 2.4 (granting immunity to personnel only before Kosovo courts,
and stating that such personnel shall be subject to their sending state's
jurisdiction).
140. See id. § 6.1 (recalling that the Secretary-General has the right and duty to
waive immunity where doing so would promote justice and would not prejudice
the UNMIK's interest).
141. Keitner, supra note 105, at 236-37.
142. See Crawford, supra note 45, at 22 (explaining that the Rome Statute's
provision that parties should not transfer a person who commits an ICC crime to a
third state unless there exist guarantees that the person will undergo investigation
and prosecution under the third state's criminal jurisdiction).
143. See id. (suggesting that, in order to comply with international law, any new
agreement should require that the sending state effectively investigate and, if
necessary, prosecute the person); see also Paust, supra note 113, at 14 (stating that
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However, if SOFAs are designed to protect a state's soldiers from
the potentially biased or unfamiliar standards and procedures of a
foreign court in the requested state, but not from prosecution and
punishment by the sending state, then they would not contravene the
object and purpose of the Rome Statute. 1 " As long as the sending
state fulfills its international obligation to prosecute such crimes
itself, then the Rome Statute's noble goal of putting an end to the
regime of impunity that protects the perpetrators of all the most
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole
would stand.

145

Remember also that SOFAs are of little use to troops in the
custody of groups not party to said agreements. This is a situation
wherein the ICC would be in a unique position to be of aid to all
parties concerned. 146 Since the ICC is an independent international
tribunal, combatants who have in their custody peace-keeping troops
suspected of committing any of the crimes punished under the Rome
Statute can opt to surrender the captured peace-keepers to the47 ICC,
rather than attempt to prosecute the peace-keepers themselves. 1
2. U.N. Peace-KeepingSOFAs

In 1990, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a Model Status of
Forces Agreement ("U.N. Model SOFA") for peace-keeping
operations. 48 The drafters intended the U.N. Model SOFA to be the
international law does not allow the immunity of people accused of a crime against
customary international law).
144. See Keitner, supra note 105, at 236 (asserting that it would be incorrect to

interpret this provision to avoid surrendering a person to the Court "because of any
obligations other than those existing between the sending State and the requested
State").
145. See id. at 237 (noting that SOFAs will not protect soldiers from prosecution
and punishment by the sending state).
146. See Lee, supra note 47, at 761 (stating that the ICC is an alternative

mechanism to protect peace-keepers even if the entity that is detaining them is not
an ICC party).
147. See id. at 760 (asserting that surrendering peace-keepers to the Court is one

way for non-parties to the ICC, rebel groups, for example, to avoid potentially
damaging political consequences).
148. See Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peace-keeping
Operations in All their Aspects - Model Status-of-Forces Agreement for Peace-
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basis for drafting individual SOFAs between the United Nations and
49
those states in which the U.N. conducts peace-keeping operations.1
A U.N. peace-keeping SOFA patterned after the U.N. Model SOFA
provides all-encompassing protection for the participants of a U.N.
peace-keeping operation.15 0 First of all, the U.N. Model SOFA treats
the Special Representative, the commander of the military
component, the high-ranking members of their staff, and the head of
the U.N. civilian police as diplomatic envoys.'51 On the other hand,
the model considers military observers and members of the U.N.
civilian police to be experts on mission, as the Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities provides. 15 2 Most relevant to the topic at
hand, however, is the following provision under paragraph 47(b)
covering military personnel: "[M]ilitary members of the military
component of the United Nations peace-keeping mission shall be
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective participating
states in respect of any criminal offenses which may be committed
by them in [host country or territory]."' 53
However, the significance of the U.N. Model SOFA has
transcended its humble beginnings as a mere tool to aid in the
drafting of individual SOFAs between the United Nations and states
in which the U.N. conducts peace-keeping operations. An example of
a specific operation not governed by a signed agreement was the
situation in Croatia.1 4 In dealing with the matter, the Office of the
keeping Operations: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess.,

Agenda Item 76, U.N. Doc. A/45/594 (1990) (providing that military members of
U.N. peace-keeping operations are subject to the jurisdiction of their respective
states).
149. See id. 1 (stating that the model SOFA may be modified as agreed upon
by the parties).
150. See id. 24 (granting the broadest privileges and immunities to highranking members of U.N. peace-keeping missions).
151. See id. (providing that sections 19 and 27 of the Convention specify this
status).
152. See id. 26 (stating that Articles V and VII of the Convention confer these
privileges and immunities).
153. Id. 47(b).
154. See United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Croatia - UNTAES
(providing background information on the U.N. peace-keeping operations in
Croatia), at http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/untaes-b.htm (last visited
Mar. 16, 2004).
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Legal Adviser to the United Nations concluded that customary
practices and principles applicable to U.N. peace-keeping or similar
operations as codified in the U.N. Model SOFA governed the status
of the U.N. forces and operations in Croatia.'55 The two-tiered
immunity scheme provided that military personnel operating under
the U.N. Model SOFA, or a U.N. peace-keeping SOFA based
thereon, were imbued with the character of customary international
law.

156

Clearly, entering into a U.N. peace-keeping SOFA with a
receiving state in pursuance of a peace-keeping mission would
actually provide more protection for the troops and personnel of
participating states than those personnel would enjoy under a
bilateral non-surrender agreement.'57 In the case of a U.N. peacekeeping SOFA, the sending state's duties do not end with the barring
of surrender to an international tribunal, as the SOFA would vest all
jurisdiction over the erring personnel solely in the sending state. As a
result, the ICC would be unable to request the surrender of an
individual if a U.N. peace-keeping SOFA governed his or her
58
activities.
Some commentators have even opined that "the ICC creates
greater protections against surrender and prosecution during peacekeeping operations than current ad hoc tribunals."' 59 Personnel
participating in peace-keeping missions "will be free from ICC
prosecution so long as their nation of origin investigates and properly

155. See Sharp, supra note 119, at 118 (maintaining that the Secretary-General
restated this position in 1991 in the Model Agreement Between the United Nations
and Member States Contributing Personnel and Equipment to United Nations
Peace-keeping Operations, explaining that before the conclusion of any particular
SOFA, the United Nations would first apply the customary principles of the U.N.
Model SOFA).
156. See id. (stating that the terms of the Model SOFA extend to operations
established and conducted under U.N. authority).
157. See Rosenfeld, supra note 87, at 290 (suggesting that the U.N. Model
SOFA provides greater protection than waivers or assignments of jurisdiction other
SOFAs afford).
158. See id. (asserting that peace-keepers will be free from ICC prosecution only
provided their nation of origin investigates and properly prosecutes any potential
crimes they may have committed).
159. Id.
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prosecutes any potential crimes they may have committed."' 6 ° Also,
securing immunity for a sending state's personnel through a U.N.
peace-keeping SOFA would go a long way towards dispelling the
impression that any one state is getting special treatment for its
nationals who participate in international armed conflicts. Since the
personnel who would enjoy insulation from the jurisdiction of an
international tribunal would be participating in a U.N. peace-keeping
operation, as opposed to a unilateral initiative, and would fall under a
SOFA based upon the U.N. Model SOFA, the U.N. member states, if
not all of the states in the international community, would have
implicitly consented to such an arrangement. This would serve as an
incentive for state parties to coordinate their overseas military
activities with the United Nations and would discourage unilateral
initiatives that have often received little or no support from the
greater majority of states party to the United Nations.
E. COMPLEMENTARITY AND THE MUNICIPAL PROSECUTION OF

CRIMES PUNISHED BY THE ROME STATUTE

Undoubtedly, the most effective device that a state can use to
avoid having its nationals tried before the ICC exists within the
Rome Statute itself: the Rule of Complementary Jurisdiction. Under
Article 17(1) of the Rome Statute, two grounds which would render a
case inadmissible before the ICC are that:
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has
jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to
carry out the investigation or prosecution;
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over
it and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless
the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the state
genuinely to prosecute. 161
Evidently, a state can prevent the ICC from possessing the
authority to commence a case against its nationals simply by
162
demonstrating its ability to genuinely prosecute such individuals.
160. Id.
161. Rome Statute, supra note 1,art. 17(l)(a)-(b).
162. See id. (providing, on the contrary, that a case is admissible to the ICC if
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Even a state's decision not to prosecute such persons may serve as
a bar to prosecution before the ICC, so long as the authorities
undertake the investigation yielding such a conclusion in good faith.
This is because the investigative and prosecutory jurisdiction of the
ICC is "intended as a back-up to the exercise of national criminal
jurisdiction over war crimes, genocide, and crimes against
humanity."' 63 National laws creating personal, territorial, or universal
jurisdiction over the crimes defined by the Rome Statute in turn
compel the exercise of national criminal jurisdiction over these same
crimes. 164 Thus, the ICC could only request cooperation or surrender
of a person if those states also possessing jurisdiction proved that
they were unwilling or unable to exercise it.' 65 This principle is in
line with the United Nations' sense that every state has the right66 to
try its own nationals for war crimes and crimes against humanity.
However, before a state can persuasively assert its ability to
genuinely investigate and prosecute the crimes punished by the
Rome Statute, it must satisfy a vital condition: a state must
reengineer its municipal laws to make them compatible with the
international cooperative effort to investigate, prosecute, and
generally suppress international crimes such as those defined by the
Rome Statute. 167 In pursuit of this goal, such a state should
criminalize all acts that are considered crimes within the jurisdiction
of the ICC. 68 Thus, an act that constitutes a crime as defined by the
the state is unwilling or unable to carry out the investigation or prosecution).
163. Keitner, supra note 105, at 228.
164. See id. (stating that this approach ensures that international criminals do not
"enjoy impunity based on the unavailability of judicial remedies at the national
level," and, absent the ability or willingness of state authorities to exercise criminal
jurisdiction, that individuals facing prosecution at the hands of the ICC will enjoy
an "impartial tribunal with adequate due process guarantees").
165. See id. at 237 (suggesting that the complementary jurisdiction of the ICC
promotes international criminal accountability).
166. See G.A. Res. 2840, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 88, 2, U.N.
Doc. A/8592 (1971) (presupposing that states may prosecute their own nationals
by urging states to cooperate in coordinating information to prosecute persons
accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity).
167. See Mugwanya, supra note 76, at 737 (suggesting that states have a duty to
respond to human rights violations that amount to commissions of international
crimes).
168. See id. at 764 (stating that the domestication of international criminal law
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Rome Statute should also constitute a crime under a state's municipal
law. 169
The duty of states to enact legislation necessary to provide
effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be
committed, specified acts that constitute war crimes, as defined by
the Rome Statute, has long existed in codified form under the four
Geneva Conventions of 1949,170 as well as in the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide ("Genocide
Convention") of December 9, 1948.171 Furthermore, one recalls that
the United Nations confirmed the existence of an overriding duty of
states to cooperate with each other on a bilateral and multilateral
basis with a view to halting and preventing war crimes and crimes
against humanity, and, most significantly, to take the domestic and
international measures necessary for that purpose. 17 2 Accordingly,
should go "hand in hand with and be buttressed by" international mechanisms).
169. See id. at 738 (arguing that states must incorporate the gravamen of all
international crimes into their domestic criminal regimes in order to conform with
customary international law).
170. See Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, ch. 9, art. 49 (asserting that
the contracting parties shall enact legislation to provide penal sanctions for those
grave
breaches),
committing
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/geneva05.htm (last visited Mar. 25,
2004); see also Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, ch. 8, art.
50 (requesting contracting parties to provide penal sanctions for those committing
legislation),
breaches
through
enacting
grave
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/geneva06.htm (last visited Mar. 25,
2004); Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, art. 129 (asking contracting parties to enact any legislation
necessary to provide punishment in the form of sanctions for persons committing
grave
breaches),
to
be
committed
any
or
ordering
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/geneva03.htm (last visited Mar. 25,
2004); Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 146 (requiring contracting parties to enact legislation to
punish grave breaches such as willful killing, torture, or inhuman treatment),
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/geneva07.htm (last visited Mar. 25,
2004) [hereinafter, cumulatively, Geneva Conventions].
171. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, art. 5, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide
Convention].
172. See G.A. Res. 3074, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess, Supp. No. 30, at 4, U.N. Doc.
A/9326 (1973) (promoting international cooperation in the "detection, arrest,
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even if an individual state cannot unilaterally create international
crimes, the duty arising from the treaties to which such state is a
party, as well as customary international law, require said state to
enforce international criminal law. This rule applies with more force
to those states that are party to treaties that explicitly provide for the
duty to prosecute, punish, or extradite offenders, otherwise known as
falls
the principle of aut dedere autjudicare.17 3 Thus, the obligation
174
law.
criminal
international
domesticate
to
states
to such
Commenting on the specific situation of the United States,
and desirability of
Scheffer recognizes the workability
complementarity, stating that:
The complementarity principle requires that the ICC defer to national
legal systems that are willing and able to investigate and, if merited,
prosecute perpetrators over which they have jurisdiction. The United
States should be able to meet this test with respect to U.S. personnel, and
thus render inadmissible any relevant case, provided U.S. federal law and
the Uniform Code of Military Justice are amended to track thoroughly all
of the specific crimes in Articles 5-8 of the ICC Treaty. Without such
amendments to U.S. law, arguments could be raised that a gap in U.S. law
renders the United States "unable" to investigate and prosecute the
specific crime. Many of the concerns about the complementarity regime
as it would be applied to the United States are concerns that would be
vastly diminished if U.S.175law were revised to close the gaps between U.S.
law and the ICC Treaty.

Further advocating support for the exercise of complementary
jurisdiction by the United States, Scheffer illustrates how current
U.S. law addresses the acts that constitute crimes under the Rome
Statute.

extradition and punishment of persons guilty of war crimes").
173. See Mugwanya, supra note 76, at 705-06 (pointing out the argument that
states party to treaties requiring them to prosecute, punish, or extradite offenders
have a duty under this maxim of international law to domesticate those same
provisions, and that non-parties may still have a duty to prosecute, punish, or
extradite perpetrators of certain core universal crimes ,under customary
international law).
174. See id. (suggesting also that the "interconnectedness and mutuality between
international criminal law and international human rights" provides the most
compelling basis for the domestication of international criminal law).
175. Scheffer, supra note 103, at 88.
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The basic U.S. law on the subject is the Uniform Code of Military
Justice. 76 Said law covers several of the most egregious acts that
would fall under the category of war crimes. 77 On the other hand, the
U.S. federal law only punishes genocide at the hands of U.S.
nationals or when committed within the United States. 78 Finally,
these provisions do not deal at all squarely with crimes against
humanity per se; instead, as Scheffer offers, current federal and state
legislation punishes only some of the underlying acts or conduct that
would constitute crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute. 17 9
Thus, a cursory review of U.S. law already reveals significant gaps in
providing for the investigation, prosecution, and punishment of the
crimes that are within the jurisdiction of the ICC.
Additionally, the Rome Statute expressly provides that the crimes
within the jurisdiction of the ICC "shall not be subject to any statute
of limitations."' 80 Again, as Scheffer recognizes, statutes of
limitations under the federal criminal code and the Uniform Code of
Military Justice could bring the ICC to conclude that investigation is
necessary merely because the U.S. statute of limitations for
prosecution of a certain crime has expired. Thus, he recommends
their revision to make them more reflective of the reality of Article
8
29 of the Rome Statute.' '

176. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-940 (2004)

(assigning particularized treatment to military personnel as specified by Congress).
177. See id. §§ 918-20 (prohibiting murder, manslaughter, and rape).
178. See Scheffer, supra note 54, at 16 (stating that applicable portions of
federal law in the United States extend no further than to U.S. nationals, and do not
explicitly address crimes against humanity or the crime of genocide).
179. See id. (explaining that federal and state statutes punish crimes such as
torture, rape, kidnapping, and assaults, which can be classified as constituting
crimes against humanity, but pointing out that no comprehensive substantive
criminal proscriptions analogous to the provisions of the Rome State exist at

domestic U.S. law).
180. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 29 (noting the non-applicability of any
statute of limitations to any crime that falls under the sweep of the Rome Statute).
181. See Scheffer, supra note 54, at 17 (positing that the existence of statutes of

limitations in certain federal statutes and in the Uniform Code of Military Justice
could invite the ICC to investigate crimes allegedly committed by U.S. nationals,
and recommending revision of the codes so that the ICC does not begin an

investigation merely because the U.S. statute of limitations may have run).
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In sum, Scheffer submits that the federal criminal code and the
Uniform Code of Military Justice are outdated and will deprive the
United States of its "first line of defense" against ICC jurisdiction,
and that consensus can be reached regarding the need to amend
them.182 Similarly, once the United States amends its legislation,
providing for jurisdiction over all of these crimes, the principle of
complementarity will require that the ICC stop short of requesting
the surrender of suspected American criminals where the United
States thoroughly investigates and, where appropriate, prosecutes
them.183 The recommended measures are characteristic of the kind of
concrete response that a state should develop in order to fully utilize
the protection afforded by the exercise of complementary jurisdiction
with respect to the crimes punished by the Rome Statute.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. THE SUNSET CLAUSE

Given the current state of affairs, any country that has entered into
a bilateral non-surrender agreement and that is truly interested in
eradicating any doubts with regard to its good faith intent to comply
with its obligations under both customary international law in
general, and the Rome Statute in particular, has four options. The
first and admittedly most obvious option would be for a government
to simply wait out the natural life of the bilateral non-surrender
agreement and not renew it, or simply exercise any termination
clause that their bilateral non-surrender agreement may feature. This
option would, of course, be available only if their bilateral nonsurrender agreements had appropriately worded termination clauses.
The European Union Council has even prescribed the inclusion of
these "sunset clauses" to all of its member states that are considering
182. See id. at 10, 15 (recognizing that, according to the principle of
complementarity, amending statutes of limitation under the federal criminal code
and the Uniform Code of Military Justice would ensure that it will fall to U.S.
courts, and not the ICC, to try crimes within the scope of the Rome Statute).
183. See Hall, supra note 91, at 788 (arguing that the current efforts of the U.S.

Congress and the Executive to seek exemptions for U.S. nationals for committing
"genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes on the territory of a State party"
ignore the principle of complementarity, as well as safeguards inserted in the

Rome Statute).
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entering into bilateral non-surrender agreements with the United
18 4
States.
The Surrender Agreement that the United States and the
Philippines concluded, for example, is to remain in force for one year
after the date on which one contracting party notifies the other of its
intent to terminate the Agreement." 5 Remember that the Philippines
and the United States entered into this Agreement through an
exchange of diplomatic notes; neither the Philippine Senate nor the
U.S. Senate had any hand in it.11 6 There was neither concurrence
through a vote among the senators nor was there a resolution in
support of the bilateral non-surrender agreement. If the Philippine
government insists that the United States did not pressure it into
signing the bilateral non-surrender agreement, then non-renewal of
the bilateral non-surrender agreement, less than a year hence, could
sufficiently convince most people. 87
B. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT BY THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL

COURT
Secondly, if a government sincerely wishes to ensure that its acts
are compatible with the Rome Statute, it can seek a definitive judicial
determination by the ICC.1la Article 119 of the Rome Statute
184. See Draft Conclusions, supra note 55 (affirming that the European Union is
firmly committed to the establishment and effective functioning of the ICC, and
providing guidelines for E.U. member states to consider when entering into a
bilateral non-surrender agreement with the United States).
185. See Surrender Agreement, supra note 35 (providing that the agreement's
provisions apply to any act or allegation arising before the agreement's
termination).
186. See 3 Solons Contest RP-U.S. Pact, MANILA STANDARD, Sept. 12, 2003,
2003 WL 71294351 (alleging that some Filipino leaders felt the execution of the
Philippine-U.S. bilateral non-surrender agreement was a "hush-hush" affair).
187. See Letter from Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch,
to Colin Powell, Secretary of State, United States (Dec. 9, 2003) (maintaining that
many countries signed bilateral non-surrender agreements with the United States as
a result of "unbearable" U.S. pressure, including threats of cuts in military aid as
well as other sanctions), http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/12/usl20903-1tr.htm (last
visited Mar. 21, 2003).
188. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 49, at 16 (stating that it is up to the ICC, an
independent international body, and not the individual states, to determine how
much legal weight to afford to U.S. bilateral non-surrender agreements).
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expressly authorizes this course of action: "any dispute concerning
the judicial functions of the Court shall be settled by the decision of
the Court.' 89 The government can, in this situation, submit the
bilateral non-surrender agreement itself to the ICC, which could then
exercise its prerogative to scrutinize the same. Whether a bilateral
non-surrender agreement would preclude the ICC from requesting
the surrender of an individual amounts to a dispute concerning the
judicial function of the ICC; any dispute concerning the exercise of
this particular judicial function of the ICC falls to the ICC itself. 90
This principle applies whether the dispute arises when the ICC
contemplates a request for surrender or after making a request.1 9'
C. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT BY THE ASSEMBLY OF STATES PARTIES

All disputes that do not involve ICC jurisdiction come under the
following provision of the Rome Statute:
2. Any other dispute between two or more States Parties relating to the
interpretation or application of this Statute which is not settled through
negotiations within three months of their commencement shall be referred
to the Assembly of States Parties. The Assembly may itself seek to settle
the dispute or may make recommendations on further means of settlement
of the dispute, including referral to the International
Court of Justice in
192
conformity with the Statute of that Court.

There is authority stating that the controversy that revolves around
the interpretation or application of Article 98(2) to bilateral nonsurrender agreements may not be within the ICC's decisional
competence. 93 Since the dispute would not relate to whether or not

189. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 119 (outlining the method of dispute
settlement under the Rome Statute).
190. See Crawford, supra note 45, at 24 (describing the ICC's jurisdiction over a
case for the surrender of an individual under Article 89(1) of the Rome Statute).
191. See id. at 26-27 (summarizing the instances where such judicial review
might occur and subsequent actions of the ICC).
192. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 119(2).
193. See Crawford, supra note 45, at 27 (contemplating a situation where the
ICC would not have jurisdiction and suggesting that this might occur where the
issue itself is whether the conclusion of a bilateral non-surrender agreement
violates the Rome Statute).
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the ICC was obliged to respect the agreements, it would not involve
the judicial functions of the ICC.
Instead, one could frame the controversy in such a way that the
issue would be whether or not the conclusion or maintenance of a
bilateral non-surrender agreement by a state party is contrary to the
Rome Statute. If the question appeared thus, then the dispute could
go to the Assembly of States Parties, which in turn could deal with it
in any number of ways. It has been suggested that the Assembly of
States Parties could possibly resolve the dispute by adopting a
resolution authoritatively interpreting Article 98(2) of the Rome
Statute. 194 Such a decision would constitute a matter of substance,
would be subject to the approval of a two-thirds majority of those
present and voting at a session of the Assembly of States Parties
wherein an absolute majority of the states parties, representing the
quorum for voting, is present. 9 Of course, Article 119(2) allows the
Assembly of States Parties to recommend a myriad of means towards
settlement of the dispute, including referral of the same to the ICJ. 196
D. MUNICIPAL PROSECUTION THROUGH THE EXERCISE OF
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION

A state with custody over an accused criminal may not ignore the
findings of the ICC if the ICC's prosecutor successfully establishes
that there is a prima facie case against the accused. 197 If the requested
state refuses to surrender to the ICC an individual covered by a
194. See id. (noting specific authority for this course of action under Article
112(7)(a) of the Rome Statute).
195. See id. (determining that the adoption of a resolution is a matter of
substance and therefore requires more than a simple majority, as provided in
Article 112(7)(b) of the Rome Statute); see also Rome Statute, supra note 1, art.
112(7)(a)-(b) (defining the voting and quorum requirements for procedural and

substantive issues before the Assembly of State Parties).
196. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 119(2) (providing that the Assembly of
States Parties shall hear any dispute not settled within three months of
commencement of negotiations, and may settle the dispute themselves or
recommend another means of settlement).
197. See Danilenko, supra note 86, at 478 (noting that, even if the state is under
no positive legal obligation to surrender an accused for an international trial, an
argument exists that the principle of aut dedere aut judicare may compel surrender
once the prosecution has made out a prima facie case, and additionally, that the
state may feel extralegal pressure to pursue a domestic trial).
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bilateral non-surrender agreement the requested state has with
another state, the requested state must fulfill its obligations under the
Rome Statute in some other way.198 This is especially true if there is
reason to believe that the refusal to turn over the requested persons to
the ICC would result in clothing said persons with impunity for the
commission of any of the crimes the Rome Statute defines. 99 In this
situation, the Rome Statute allows the requested state to satisfy its
seemingly conflicting obligations through the exercise of jurisdiction
over the case, invoking the Rome Statute's system of
complementarity.
As discussed above, the ICC's system of complementary
jurisdiction vests primary jurisdiction over crimes defined by the
Rome Statute in any state that possesses the ability and willingness
to exercise jurisdiction over such cases. When such a state genuinely
exercises jurisdiction over a case, whether or not said state decides to
prosecute, the ICC deems that case as inadmissible." 0 Clearly, the
catalyst is the act of the subject state in exercising jurisdiction over a
particular case that would normally fall within the complementary
jurisdiction of the ICC. However, if the prosecuting state does not
possess any direct interest in the case, the only way it could exercise
jurisdiction over the case would be under the theory of universality
or universal jurisdiction.20 '
198. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 86 (defining a state's general
obligation to cooperate with the ICC's investigation and prosecution of crimes
within the ICC's jurisdiction).
199. See Memorandum from the Coalition Secretariat, Coalition for the
International Criminal Court to Coalition Members and Government
Representatives (Aug. 23, 2002) (dubbing the U.S. bilateral non-surrender
agreements "impunity agreements," stating that the only purpose for the
agreements is to provide immunity from the ICC, and positing that they undermine
the purpose of the Rome Statute by preventing the ICC from exercising its
complementary function when states are unwilling to investigate or prosecute
accused
criminals),
available
at
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/otherissues/impunityart98/ciccart98memo2002
0823.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2003).
200. See Danilenko, supra note 86, at 475-76 (stating that the ICC complements
and does not replace national courts, and that therefore, where a state undertakes
domestic procedures and is willing or able to prosecute the accused, the ICC will
not interfere). However, the ICC has the power to determine whether the state is
genuinely willing and able to bring the accused to justice. Id.
201. See Michael P. Scharf, Application of Treaty-Based Universal Jurisdiction
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1. UniversalJurisdiction
Preliminarily, it is important to understand that states do not
possess exclusive jurisdiction over their nationals even when they act
in an official capacity. 0 2 "A sovereign state or a legal entity that has
some sovereign attributes can enforce the prescription of another
state, or of international law, even though the enforcing power may
not have prescribed what it enforces.2 0 3 It is upon these principles
that we lay the foundation for the exercise of universal jurisdiction.
Bassiouni writes that in the exercise of universal jurisdiction, a
state acts in the interest of the international community in a manner
2 °4 In this
equivalent to the Roman concept of actio popularis.
manner, the state acts as an agent of the community of states because
it has "an interest in the preservation of world order as a member of
2 5 Under actio popularis, a state may exercise
that community.""
universal jurisdiction even if there is no jurisdictional link between
the territory where the crime was allegedly committed, the
nationality of the accused, the nationality of the victim, and the state
seeking to exercise jurisdiction over the case.20 6 The sole basis for the
exercise of such jurisdiction would be the nature of the crime, and
the sole purpose is to "enhance world order by ensuring
accountability for the perpetration of certain crimes."20 7
to Nationals of Non-Party States, 35 NEW ENG. L. REv. 363, 368 (2001) (defining
universal jurisdiction as a concept that would provide all states with jurisdiction
over certain crimes of universal concern regardless of the perpetrator's nationality,
locus of the crime, or the nationality of the victim).
202. See id. at 377 (explaining that a state may try to intercede through
diplomatic channels when another state tries to prosecute that state's national, but
that the state has no legal right to require that their nationals may only face trial in
their home state).
203.

Bassiouni, supra note 86, at 89.

204. See id. at 88 (explaining the rationale behind universal jurisdiction).
205. Id. This writer also acknowledges that while a state may have its own
interests in prosecuting an accused, the state exercises its own jurisdiction, and not
universal jurisdiction, if those interests are jurisdictionally-based. Id.
206. See id. at 88-89 (arguing that, because a state asserting universal
jurisdiction does so as an agent of the universal community, it must put the
interests of the overall international community above its own national interests).
207. See id. at 88-89, 96 (identifying the basis for universal jurisdiction and
asserting that the state exercising universal jurisdiction "carries out a actio
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Importantly, "the application of universal jurisdiction for certain
international crimes does not necessarily mean that it should be
devoid of any connection to the enforcing state, or that it has
precedence over other theories of jurisdiction. ' 20 8 Thus, distilling the
rationale behind the exercise of such jurisdiction is paramount, for it
also serves as an enumeration of the requisites for the proper exercise
of universal jurisdiction. The rationale would appear to be thus: "1.
no other state or entity can exercise jurisdiction on the basis of the
traditional doctrines; 2. no other state or entity has a direct interest;
and 3. there is an interest of the international community to
enforce. 20 9 When the exercise of universal jurisdiction is carried out
on the basis of these underlying principles, the state involved
"exercise[s] universal jurisdiction not only as national jurisdiction,
but also as a surrogate for the international community. ' ' 210 Namely, a
state that exercises universal jurisdiction "carries out an actio
popularis against persons who are hostis humani generis. 21'
Commentators have asserted the existence of a right to exercise
universal jurisdiction over international crimes, particularly those
defined by the Rome Statute, in varying degrees of persuasive
weight, on the strength of several sources of international law. 212 A
number of conventions provide, implicitly or explicitly, for universal
jurisdiction with respect to certain international crimes; some argue
polularis against persons who are hostis humani generis," or "enemies of the
human race," that is, those who offend certain basic core obligations to
humankind).
208. Id. at 104.
209. Bassiouni, supra note 86, at 96.
210. Id. This author sets forth two rationales underlying the transcendence of
state sovereignty: the first is a universalist approach realizing principles and
standards shared by the international community transcend singular national
interests, and the second is pragmatic and policy oriented rationale recognizing that
these commonly shared principles and standards occasionally need a universal
enforcement mechanism. Id.
211. Id.
212. See Danilenko, supra note 86, at 479-82 (noting that the drafters of the
Rome Statute were concerned that the statute sought to codify a body of customary
law so vague that it might violate the principle of legality). This author also asserts
that many of the current conventions relating to criminal law are so vague
regarding definitions of crimes that they are only binding as customary
international law. Id.
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that several of these treaties, such as certain provisions of the Geneva
Conventions and the Genocide Convention, have become part of
customary international law.213 But not all of these conventions
include provisions on universal jurisdiction, and many that do are
unclear.2" 4 The status of these "crimes as jus cogens also implies that
universal jurisdiction over them exists. ' 215 Commentators have cited
general principles of law as the basis for elevating certain
international crimes to the level of jus cogens. "The writings of the
most distinguished publicists support the proposition that jus cogens
crimes require the application of universal jurisdiction when other
means of carrying out the obligations derived from aut dedere aut
judicare have proven ineffective. 2 6 Thus, Bassiouni submits that it
is the cumulative weight of all these international law sources, along
with national legislation and judicial practices, that provides
sufficient basis to find the existence of universal jurisdiction for jus
cogens and even other international crimes. 17
a. Genocide
The Genocide Convention "declares that genocide is a crime under
international law for which an individual perpetrator is culpable, and

213. See id. at 482, 485 (recognizing that the ICJ ruled that the principles
underlying the Genocide Convention are considered binding on civilized nations
even without conventional obligations, and noting that certain provisions of the
Geneva Conventions are considered binding on all states with or without
ratification).
214. See Bassiouni, supra note 86, at 151-52 (analogizing the current state of
recognition of universal jurisdiction to a checkerboard, and noting that its
recognition is uneven and inconsistent).
215. Id. at 152.
216. Id. at 149.
217. See id. at 149-50 (arguing that the cumulative theory of universal
jurisdiction for jus cogens crimes runs counter to the "purist theory" of
international law that requires each of these sources of law to rise to the level of
legal sufficiency before attaining the status of binding international law). But see
Lee A. Casey, The Case Against the International Criminal Court, 25 FORDHAM
INT'L L. J. 840, 857 (2002) (submitting that questions regarding the application of
the universality principle in the United States is entirely academic, and that
acceptance of the principle of universality is not widespread enough to warrant its
application).
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'
However, the
for which ... states have a duty to prosecute."218
Genocide Convention seems to allow a relatively limited number of
avenues for the prosecution of genocide, as compared to multilateral
treaties covering war crimes and crimes against humanity, which are
discussed below.21 9 Article 6 of the Genocide Convention provides
that "persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts
enumerated in Article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the
State in the territory of which the, act was committed."220 An
international penal tribunal that has jurisdiction over state parties
may also try persons charged with genocide.22'

At first blush, it seems clear that the venues where prosecution of
a particular instance of genocide can proceed are limited to the state
in whose territory the act was committed, or before an international
tribunal whose jurisdiction the state parties involved have
accepted.
However, the ICJ has recognized that the rights and
obligations enshrined in the Genocide Convention are rights and
obligations erga omnes, and that "the principles underlying the
[Genocide] Convention are principles which are recognized by
civilized nations as binding on States, even without any conventional
obligation. "223
The proscription of genocide possesses the status of jus cogens,
and any derogation from such a norm is properly subject to the
exercise of jurisdiction by any state on the basis of universality; for
example, customary international law recognizes the universality of
218. See Henry T. King & Theodore C. Theofrastous, From Nuremberg to
Rome: A Step Backward for U.S. Foreign Policy, 31 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 47,
58 (1999). The authors describe the consequences and state response that custom
anticipates when a party violates the Genocide Convention.
219. Compare Genocide Convention, supra note 171 (narrowing the scope of
prosecution under the Convention to only those crimes related to genocide and
genocide-related activities), with Geneva Conventions, supra note 170 (covering a
broad range of human rights violations under which a violator may face
prosecution under the Conventions).
220. Genocide Convention, supra note 171, art. 6.
221. See id. (providing an alternate option under the Genocide Convention that
would require a violator to face prosecution).
222. See id. (describing the instances of full prosecutorial authority against a
perpetrator of genocide under Article 6 of the Genocide Convention).
223. Danilenko, supra note 86, at 482-83.
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jurisdiction for genocide, even though there is no state practice to
support that argument.224 Furthermore, a stance receiving increased
recognition from leading commentators argues that any state may
prosecute the crime of genocide, despite the absence of a provision
on universal jurisdiction in the Genocide Convention. 25
"Notwithstanding the absence of support in conventional
international law and in the practice of states for the unqualified
assertion that genocide ipso facto allows universal jurisdiction, [the
ICTY has ruled,] in connection with genocide,.., that 'universal
jurisdiction [is] nowadays acknowledged in the case of international
crimes.""" The ICTR made a similar ruling, holding that universal
jurisdiction exists for the crime of genocide. 27 Thus, the courts of all
nations may assert, as a matter of international obligation,
jurisdiction over persons accused of genocide. 28
b. Crimes Against Humanity
Currently, there is no specialized convention dedicated to the
codification of crimes against humanity. 229 Before the adoption of the
Rome Statute, the closest approximation to this sort of specialized

224. See Mugwanya, supra note 76, at 743-44 (explaining that one can be guilty

of genocide even when the act occurs in a nation that is not a member of the
Genocide Convention, since the act of genocide is universally criminal).
225. See Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities,
89 AM. J. INT'L L. 554, 569 (1995) (emphasizing how genocide need not be made a
crime through the passage of international agreements, but exists as a crime in any
nation where it takes place); see also Bassiouni, supra note 86, at 121 (supporting
the concept that genocide should be widely outlawed in conjunction with the
Genocide Convention, and not exclusively through the Genocide Convention).
226. Bassiouni, supra note 86, at 121-22.
227. See Prosecutor v. Ntuyahaga, Case No. ICTR-90-40-T, Decision on the
Prosecutor's Motion to Withdraw the Indictment (Mar. 18, 1999) (creating a
precedent promoting the concept that all nations may hold jurisdiction to judge acts
of genocide).
228. See Mugwanya, supra note 76, at 743 (asserting that such concepts "pierce"
notions of sovereignty such that all nations may exercise jurisdiction over
offenders "as a matter of international obligation").
229. See Bassiouni, supra note 86, at 119 (expounding on the fact that the
international legal community, while creating other specific conventions to deal
with genocide and torture, has failed to create a more general convention
addressing crimes against humanity).
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convention existed in the myriad of separate conventions and treaties
proscribing individual crimes, such as conventions relating to
apartheid and torture. 30 But the conventions relative to those crimes
do not contain clear provisions, and in some cases contain no
provisions at all, on universal jurisdiction. However, "as a jus cogens
international crime, 'crimes against humanity' are presumed to carry
the obligation to prosecute or extradite, and to allow States to rely on
'
In
universality for prosecution, punishment, and extradition."231
addition, crimes against humanity comprise part of customary
international law. 32 As part of customary international law, they
impose an obligation on the international community to prosecute,
punish, or extradite offenders for such crimes that has the same force
as a treaty, but which surpasses a state's conventional, or treatybased, obligations. 33
A prime example of the exercise of universal jurisdiction in a case
involving a crime against humanity is the treatment of torture. The
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment ("Torture Convention") allows state parties
to exercise jurisdiction over offenders located within a state's
230. See International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the
Crime of Apartheid, G.A. Res. 3068, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, U.N.
Doc. A/9030 (1973) [hereinafter Apartheid Convention] (making apartheid a crime
against humanity in violation of international law, and recognizing apartheid as a
world),
the
throughout
security
and
to
peace
threat
serious
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/11.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2004); see also
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc.
A/39/51 (1984), entered into force June 26, 1987, draft reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027
(1985) [hereinafter Torture Convention] (establishing that certain acts, such as
inflicting severe physical or mental pain on an individual for the purpose of
obtaining information or a confession, constitute crimes against humanity,
violative of international law), http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/hcat39.htm
(last visited Mar. 26, 2004).
231. Bassiouni, supra note 86, at 119. The author affirms the far-reaching
jurisdiction and power of states to respond to crimes against humanity by
punishing those who commit them. Id.
232. See Mugwanya, supra note 76, at 755 (noting that such crimes are a feature
of both conventional and customary international law, meaning that they compel
states to enforce them whether or not those states are party to a treaty that would
positively bind them to such an obligation).
233. See id. (outlining the responsibilities of states and the international
community when dealing with offenders of crimes against humanity).
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territory regardless of where the offender committed the acts of
torture, provided the individual does not face extradition. 34
Furthermore, "state recognition and domestic criminalization of
[torture] is arguably widespread enough to be deemed to have
crystallized into customary international law. '"235
c. War Crimes
Article 8(a) of the Rome Statute provides, in part, that "'war
crimes' means ... [g]rave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. 236
These breaches are now considered jus cogens international
crimes. 237 The Geneva Conventions all require each state party to
search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have been
ordered to commit, grave breaches within that member state's
borders, and to bring such persons, regardless of their nationality,
before its own courts. 238 Thus, it is clear that all state parties possess
the right to exercise jurisdiction over all persons accused of grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions perpetrated within their national
borders. In effect, if a state wants to prosecute a person for war
crimes in such a scenario, that state need not ask the permission of
the perpetrator's native state, or any other state, since the prosecuting
state may go ahead and prosecute the perpetrator by the express
terms of those agreements.239 There exists authority stating that the
234. See Torture Convention, supra note 230, art. 5 (indicating that states must
take measures to establish jurisdiction "over such offenses in cases where the
alleged offender is present in any territory under its jurisdiction," as well as over
various other cases and situations).
235. Scharf, supranote 201, at 374.
236. Rome Statute, supra note 1.
237. See Bassiouni, supra note 86, at 116 (commenting on how violations of the
Geneva Conventions, especially those violations that are extreme in nature, will be
deemed punishable under the principles of universality contained in international

law).
238. See Geneva Conventions, supra note 170 (imposing upon member nations
to the Conventions the responsibility of prosecuting violators of the gravest of
crimes when such crimes occur within a member nation's borders).
239. See Roger S. Clark, Creating a Statute for the International Criminal
Court: A Jurisdictional Quandary, 22 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 461, 471
(1999) (confirming the solitary action a victim state's prosecutorial authority may
take when pursuing the punishment of a violator of the Geneva Conventions or
crimes against humanity).
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Geneva Conventions give parties the right, and indeed an obligation,
to adopt national legislation without universal jurisdiction.2 40 This
obligation leads to the conclusion that "states parties cannot legally
grant amnesty or immunity from prosecution to transgressors for
24
grave breaches of these Conventions.""
Significantly, the treaty also vests this prerogative to prosecute in
states that were not a party to the war in question.2 4 The treaty
makes no distinctions based upon whether or not there is a nexus
between the accused, the alleged acts constituting grave breaches of
the Geneva Conventions, and the state that exercises jurisdiction over
the case. The Geneva Conventions also uniformly implement the aut
dedere autjudicareprinciple, giving a state party that finds itself in a
position to exercise jurisdiction over persons allegedly responsible
for such grave breaches an alternative to prosecuting the accused
before its own courts: the Geneva Conventions provide that said state
may, in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, hand
such persons over for trial to another concerned state party, provided
such state party has made out a prima facie case against the
2 43

accused.

With respect to universal jurisdiction over war crimes, Bassiouni
makes several arguments: he argues that the general enforcement
obligations, including the specific obligations to prevent and repress
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I to the
Geneva Conventions, allow states to expand their jurisdiction under
the theory of universality, even if no convention dealing with the law
of armed conflict contains a specific provision on universal
jurisdiction.244 Recognizing that the existence of universal
240. See Bassiouni, supra note 86, at 118 (describing the Conventions' mandate
that individual nations take action in the international fight against war crimes and
crimes against humanity).
241. Mugwanya, supra note 76, at 742-43.
242. See Clark, supra note 239, at 466 (reaffirming the notion that all nations
must contribute to the prosecution of war criminals, regardless where such war
crimes took place).
243. See Geneva Conventions, supra note 170 (noting the prevalence of the
extradition option for war criminals in the interplay that exists among various
states under principles of international law).
244. Bassiouni, supra note 86, at 117. This author suggests that, while such
universal authority certainly exists, it has held sway mainly among academics and
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jurisdiction yet finds insufficient support in state practice, Bassiouni
submits that "customary international law can exist irrespective of
state practice if there is strong evidence of opiniojuris, which is the
case with respect to war crimes. 245
2. Case in Point: The Republic of the Philippines-UnitedStates
BilateralNon-SurrenderAgreement, Domestic Prosecution,and the
Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of the
Philippinesand the Government of the United States ofAmerica
Regarding the Treatment of United States Armed Forces Visiting the
Philippines ("VFA ")
The VFA generally states that the Philippines shall have the
primary right to exercise jurisdiction over all offenses committed by
U.S. personnel within Philippine territory, subject to certain
significant exceptions.2 46 First, the United States shall have the
primary right to exercise jurisdiction over offenses committed by
U.S. personnel within Philippine territory when:
a) criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction over the offenses is
2 47
conferred on them by U.S. military law;
b) the offenses involved relate "to the security of the United
States, punishable under the laws of the United States, but not under
'
the laws of the Philippines;"24

experts in the field, rather than elected policy/law makers.
245. Id.
246. See Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines

and the Government of the United States of America Regarding the Treatment of
United States Armed Forces Visitng the Philippines, Feb. 10, 1998, U.S.-Phil., art.
V(3)(a), T.I.A.S. No. 12,496 [hereinafter VFA] (explaining the Philippines'

authority to prosecute U.S. military personnel when those personnel commit illegal
acts
within
the
jurisdiction),
available
at
http://www.army.mil.ph/miscellaneous/vfa.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2004). This

forces one to reconsider the notion of military jurisdictional authority and the
victim state's right to prosecute foreign military personnel.
247. See id. art. V(1)(a)-(b) (noting that while U.S. military authorities
customarily have criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction over U.S. personnel in the
Philippines, the Philippines may exercise jurisdiction over U.S. personnel if they
commit offenses punishable under Philippine law).
248. Id. art. V(2)(b).
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c) subject to military law, the offenses committed are "solely
against the property or security of the United States or offenses
2 49
solely against the property or person of United States personnel;
d) subject to military law, the offenses arise "out of any act or
omission done in performance of official duty. '25° The mere issuance
of a certification to this effect will constitute proof of performance of
official duty for the purposes of this provision. 5
Furthermore, in any case wherein the right to exercise jurisdiction
is concurrent between the Philippines and the United States, the
Philippines will waive the right upon the request of the United States,
except in cases of particular importance to the Philippines. 2
It is against the backdrop of the existing bilateral non-surrender
agreement between the United States and the Philippines, the VFA,
and the Rome Statute, that we must consider the possibility of
Philippine prosecutorial jurisdiction. We look to determine whether
there will ever be an instance when the Philippines will legally have
the option to prosecute government officials, employees, contractors,
military personnel, or nationals of the United States for any of the
crimes punished under the Rome Statute. 53
For this purpose, it is important to note that both the Philippines
and the United States are state parties to several treaties codifying
international crimes that are within the jurisdiction of the ICC, such
as the Genocide Convention,254 the Torture Convention, 255 and the
249. Id. art. V(3)(b)(i).
250. Id. art. V(3)(b)(ii).
251. See id. art. V(3)(e) (describing the certification process thus: a U.S. military
commander decides that an offense constitutes an act done out of omission or in
the performance of an official duty, and issues a certificate setting forth the
decision which, once transmitted to the Philippine authorities, will constitute
"sufficient proof of performance of official duty" and bring the actor under
primary U.S. jurisdiction).
252. See VFA, supra note 246, art. V(3)(d) (explaining that the Philippines
customarily waives its primary jurisdiction as a recognition of the U.S. military's
responsibility to maintain good order and discipline among their forces).
253. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 5 (enumerating those crimes that fall
within ICC jurisdiction as the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and the crime of aggression).
254. See Genocide Convention, supra note 171, pmbl. n.1 (listing the state
parties to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of

2004]

BILATERAL NON-SURRENDER A GREEMENTS

1173

Geneva Conventions. 6 In light of the existence of these
conventional obligations, and the fact that the exercise of universal
jurisdiction fits into the realm of customary international law, it is
arguable that the Philippines need not enact domestic legislation for
the investigation, prosecution, and punishment of these international
crimes.257 This is because the Philippine Constitution considers the
"general principles of international law [as] part of the law of the
land." 58
Firstly, one must recall that current U.S. military law does not
proscribe all of the crimes defined under the Rome Statute. 5 9 The
Uniform Code of Military Justice does not cover all instances of
genocide, as it fails to deal adequately either with the acts of U.S.
servicemen who are not U.S. nationals, or acts committed outside the
United States.260 Secondly, the United States does not punish crimes
against humanity as such, forcing potential complainants and
prosecutors to piece together indictments from scattered federal and
state criminal laws, thereby diluting the gravity of the offense and

Genocide).
255. See Torture Convention, supra note 230 (listing the State Parties to the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment).
256. See Comit6 International de la Croix-Rouge (ICRC), States Party to the
Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, 6-7 (2004) (listing states that

have ratified the Geneva Conventions, including the United States and the
Philippines),

available

at

http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteengO.nsf/htmlall/party-gc/$File/Conventions%20
(last
de%20GenSve%20et%2OProtocoles%20additionnels%20ENG-logo.pdf
visited Mar. 25, 2004).
257. See Aloysius P. Llamzon, "The Generally Accepted Principles of
InternationalLaw" as Philippine Law: Towards a Structurally Consistent Use of
Customary International Law in Philippine Courts, 47 ATENEO L.J. 243, 248

(2002) (explaining that the Philippine Constitution considers main principles of
international law to be Philippine domestic law, as well).
258. PHIL. CONST. art. II, § 2 (1987).
259. See Scheffer, supra note 54, at 16 (stating that the Uniform Code of
Military Justice fails to proscribe crimes against humanity or genocide "as
crimes"). But see Casey, supra note 217, at 850 (discussing the political

complications of allowing international prosecutorial jurisdiction for such crimes).
260. See Scheffer, supra note 54, at 16 (explaining that U.S. federal law on
genocide covers only U.S. nationals and acts that occur within the United States).
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downplaying its savagery."' The Uniform Code of Military Justice
only substantially covers war crimes, so the United States' military
personnel may be exempt from Philippine jurisdiction on such
matters. z6 2 Therefore, Article V(1)(b) of the VFA, in relation to
Article V(3)(a), cannot serve as the basis upon which to withdraw the
enumerated instances of genocide and crimes against humanity in
general from Philippine jurisdiction, since U.S. military law does not
263
cover these crimes.
Next, if a Philippine court charges any current or former
government official, employee, contractor, military personnel, or
national of the United States with commission of any of the crimes
punishable under the Rome Statute, the United States cannot assert
exclusive jurisdiction over the case on the grounds that the accused
acted under the exercise of official duty. Although it seems to be
common practice that receiving states accept a sending state's
determination that performance of an act was in the course of official
duty, "there seems to be no legal obligation" to accept such a
determination. 264 "In cases of grave international crimes of universal
concern, the receiving State could argue that the relevant acts were
not within the limits of 'official duty' and thus assert its
jurisdiction. 2 65 On the other hand, if the authorities of the receiving
state arrest the accused and do not determine through diplomatic
channels or arbitration whether the assailed acts were in the course of

261. See id. (asserting that there is no substantive criminal statute that addresses

crimes against humanity, making implementation of such proscriptions the least
effective under domestic U.S. law).
262. See id. (noting that the Military and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000
provides expansive jurisdiction over felonies committed by U.S. citizens abroad both civilians and members of the armed forces - and as such, that jurisdiction no
longer depends upon whether the U.S. Congress has officially declared war).
263. See VFA, supra note 246, art. l(b) (stating that U.S. military authorities

have the limited right to exercise their jurisdiction over United States personnel in
the Philippines only when it is "conferred on them by the military law of the

United States").
264. See Danilenko, supra note 86, at 474-75 (explaining that, although courts

of the receiving state may review certifications as to whether an act was within the
course of official duty, most accept the sending state's determination of the issue).
265. Id. at 475.
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"official duty," "the courts of the receiving State may make the final
266
determination.
The Philippine Senate, in its Resolution Concurring in the
Ratification of the Agreement Between the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States
of America Regarding the Treatment of United States Armed Forces
Visiting the Philippines, defines "official duty" so as to erase all
doubts as to the construction of the provisions of the VFA: it defines
"official duty" as
[a]ny duty or service required or authorized to be done by statute,
regulation, the order of a superior or military usage. Official duty is not
meant to include all acts by an individual during the period while he is on
duty, but is meant to apply only to acts which are required or authorized
to be done267 as a function of that duty which the individual is
performing.

Thus, it is evident that the Senate intended to limit the scope of the
exception to the exercise of Philippine jurisdiction. Not all acts that
U.S. personnel perform while they are within Philippine territory can
be shoe-horned into the category of acts done in the performance of
official duty. Among the acts that cannot fall under this category are
the specific acts that constitute the crimes defined by the Rome
Statute, and legal scholars write about this view.26 8
In their Separate Opinion in Congo v. Belgium, Judges Rosalyn
Higgins, Pieter Kooijimans and Thomas Buergenthal stated "that
serious international crimes cannot be regarded as official acts
because they are neither normal State functions nor functions that a
state alone (in contrast to an individual) can perform. '269 They claim
that "this view is underscored by the increasing realization that Staterelated motives are not the proper test for determining what

266. Id.
267. S. Res. 18, 11 th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999), in Senate of the Republic of the
Philippines, The Visiting Forces Agreement: The Senate Decision 187 (1999).
268. See generally Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.), para. 85
(Feb. 14) (noting recent law review articles and cases that discuss the idea that
"official acts," as they are usually defined, should not include grave international
crimes).
269. Id.
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constitutes public State acts," and that it "is gradually finding
expression in State practice, as evidenced in judicial decisions and
opinions."27 0
Regarding the application of this view to SOFAs in general, and
the NATO SOFA in particular, Jordan Paust suggests that under the
SOFA, international crime cannot constitute an act or omission done
in the course of official duty.27 Paust submits that the NATO SOFA,
which vests primary concurrent jurisdiction over "offences arising
out of any act or omissions done in the performance of official duty"
in the United States, does not give U.S. personnel blanket immunity
for all acts that supposedly fall under the scope of official duty.272
Even "the act or omission out of which the offense arises must be
'done in the performance of official duty' and international criminal
acts cannot properly be classified as acts done in performance of
official duty."27' 3 Thus, the disputable excuse that an act occurred in
the course of official duty cannot deprive the Philippines of the right
to exercise jurisdiction if such act amounts to a crime against
humanity or genocide perpetrated either by members of the U.S.
armed forces who are not U.S. nationals or by U.S. nationals outside
the United States.
Finally, assuming that the Philippines and the United States can
exercise concurrent jurisdiction over crimes against humanity and the
enumerated instances of genocide, the Philippines need not accede to
a request made by the United States for a waiver of jurisdiction;
although the general rule seems to be that the Philippines would
grant such a request as a matter of course, the VFA itself apparently
gives the Philippines the option to refuse in cases of "particular
importance to the Philippines. 2 74 Also, the fact that the Philippine
Senate purposely refrained from providing an exhaustive list of
crimes that would constitute cases of particular importance for the

270. Id.
271. See Paust, supra note 113, at 10 (explaining that international crimes, by
their nature, cannot arise as a part of an official duty).
272. See id. at 10-11 (explaining the limitations of the term "official act" under
NATO SOFAs).
273. Id. at 11.
274. VFA, supra note 246, art. V(3)(d).
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Philippines suggests that they would prefer to reserve interpretation
to themselves.275
Hence, there is apparently no legal obstacle to the investigation,
prosecution, and punishment by the Philippine judicial system of
U.S. nationals who commit crimes against humanity, U.S. nationals
who commit genocide outside of the United States, and members of
the U.S. armed forces who, not being U.S. nationals, commit
genocide. This delineation and particularization still leaves the
Philippines with a wide area of responsibility with regard to the
investigation, prosecution, and punishment of crimes defined under
the Rome Statute where U.S. personnel are involved.2 76 The Rome
Statute sets forth in detail the varied forms of genocide and crimes
against humanity.277 Whether the Philippine Government is up to the
challenge of fulfilling its obligations under international law remains
a question.
In light of these analyses, it is interesting to note that "the United
States has repeatedly demonstrated in its courts that it reserves the
right to prosecute foreign nationals for transgressions of customary
international law under a theory of universality.""27 Nevertheless, it
for
appears that foreign states should be able to indict U.S. nationals
2 79
violations of customary international law under the same theory.

275. S. Res. 18, 11th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999), in Senate of the Republic of the

Philippines, The Visiting Forces Agreement: The Senate Decision 187 (1999)
(evincing a desire to avoid specific enumeration of crimes of special concern with
the provision that "the following cases, among others, are considered by the
Philippines to be of particular importance").
276. See supra notes 259-263 and accompanying text (arguing that the

Philippines may have jurisdiction over crimes against humanity and crimes of
genocide perpetrated by U.S. personnel).
277. See supra note 1, arts. 6-7 (defining with great particularity those activities

that constitute genocide and crimes against humanity under the Statute).
278. King & Theofrastous, supra note 218, at 56.
279. See id. at 57 (noting that there is a "significant double standard" arising

from the fact that the United States does not submit its nationals to foreign
jurisdiction under the theory of universality). King and Theofrastous, in fact, focus
their article on the ways that states can exercise jurisdiction over U.S. nationals. Id.

They submit that if an international tribunal reserves jurisdiction, there is no reason
states cannot individually wield such power. Id.
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CONCLUSION
Bilateral non-surrender agreements that state parties to the Rome
Statute entered into are legally infirm for being in contravention
thereof28 They are anathema to the noble goal of ending impunity
for international crimes. Also, those states that vehemently refuse to
subject their nationals to the ICC's jurisdiction need not violate it so
blatantly through the mere entrance into a bilateral non-surrender
agreement; there are established, alternative measures that are
compatible with the international legal order. 81 On the other hand,
those who want to bear out the spirit of the Rome Statute and
customary international law, but who suffer the misfortune of already
having bound themselves to bilateral non-surrender agreements, are
not without recourse, for there are legal measures that they can take
to remedy the situation. 2 Thus, all, it seems, is not lost.
Unfortunately, the damage has been done. The undesirable effects
of these bilateral non-surrender agreements creep into every comer
of the international community. 3 They strain long-standing
alliances. The withdrawal of military personnel compromises peacekeeping operations." 4 Vital military aid is withheld from states that
choose to stand up against impunity. And then there are the ones that
relent: the following statement from the floor of the British House of
Commons paints a vivid picture of exactly what kind of a state would
resort to these unfortunate and questionable devices called bilateral
non-surrender agreements:
280. See discussion supra Part IV.B (explaining the requirements under Article
98(2) for surrender).
281. See discussion supra Part V (discussing the alternative methods for
obtaining immunity, for example, through the U.N. Charter or SOFAs).
282. See discussion supra Part VI (noting that there are four different ways for
states who are already parties to such agreements to remedy the situation and show
their intent to comply with both customary international law and the Rome

Statute).
283. See discussion supra Part III (describing the character of the bilateral nonsurrender agreement between the United States and the Philippines).
284. See Sean D. Murphy, Efforts to Obtain Immunity from ICC for US.
Peacekeepers, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 725, 727 (2002) (citing Colum Lynch, 3
Observers Pulled Out of East Timor, WASH. POST, July 2, 2002, at A9 (reporting

that the U.S. withdrew its military observers in East Timor on the date of the
establishment of the ICC).
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[t]he United States is now aggressively seeking to negotiate bilateral
impunity agreements for its citizens with every country that has signed up
to the ICC. Up to now, fourteen nations have signed such agreements,
although none has ratified them. They tend to be weak countries that are
dependent on American favours; they are heavily leaned on if they do not
sign. For example, the Philippines was threatened with the loss of cash for
army retraining and Romania with lack of progress
to NATO membership
285
if they did not sign the bilateral agreements.

Thus, battered, beaten and begging, they sign. The existing
bilateral non-surrender agreements leave their indelible mark on
foreign relations. They lay the foundation for a wall that will bar the
ICC from reaching the perpetrators of genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes. 86
Those states that, so far, have withstood the onslaught of
hegemony, and those states that initially buckled under the pressure
and are now ready to stand up again, must be ready to make bold
moves and tough decisions. They must realize that any hope for the
ICC's success will depend largely on the political will of states.2 87 As
discussed, the international legal mechanisms to fight impunity are
already in place. Existing treaties impose specific obligations on state
parties including "the duty to domestically criminalize the specified
offense, the duty to extradite or prosecute an offender found in its
territory, and the duty to provide judicial assistance for the
'
prosecution of such offenders by other States."288
Now, states, must
make the leap and actually fulfill these obligations.
In this era of globalization, when international compensation is
necessary to combat both international and domestic crime, the only
way by which a state may achieve the obligation "to prosecute or

285. House of Commons, Debate on the InternationalCriminal Court, 2 (Jan.
14, 2003), available at http://www.amicc.org/docs/HofC1 14-03.pdf (last visited
Mar. 17, 2004).
286. See discussion supra Part III (showing the negative qualities and legal
consequences of bilateral non-surrender agreements through discussion of the
VFA).
287. See Bassiouni, supra note 63, at 7 (stating that "[h]ow the new International
Criminal Court will work in practice will largely depend on the political will of the
States").
288. Scharf, supra note 201, at 376.
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extradite, and, where appropriate, to punish persons accused, charged
or convicted" of international or domestic criminal offenses is by
making a move as bold as the exercise of universal jurisdiction.289
States must explore this and other existing legal measures if they are
to remain true to their international obligations.
What states must realize, however, is that they need not go it
alone. Scores of states stood fast and refused to be party to schemes
designed to secure impunity for international crimes.29 ° The others
alleviate the pressure applied upon one. A truly symbiotic and
synergistic network of like-minded states must endeavor to
coordinate their efforts and aid each other's efforts to resist the
temptation to bargain away their ability to fulfill international
obligations in good faith.
In the end, it all boils down to how far states are willing to go for
the fight against impunity, how badly they wish to see genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes punished, and what they are
willing to sacrifice for the good of the international community.
Indeed, for humanity's sake, one hopes that states meet the challenge
head on, bolstered by the strength of their collective political will.

289. See Bassiouni, supra note 86, at 150 (arguing that while the state of judicial
practice, national and international, is insufficient to establish the principle of
universality as a feature of customary international law, there is also enough
support in current practice "to find the existence of universal jurisdiction for jus
cogens and even other international crimes").
290. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text (explaining that, although
the United States has mounted a worldwide campaign to secure bilateral nonsurrender agreements, they have only concluded fifty-five such agreements).

